It’s probably getting lost with so much other news but it’s been an interesting few weeks for Belarus. For a country that always seemed just a WMD allegation from being another axis of evil country under George Bush, perhaps the experience of more constructive interrnational relations is a bit disorienting. Yet here we have the IMF actually praising the country’s economic management and specifically its move to a more flexible exchange rate regime (hint hint Baltics?), a friendly reception for an EU delegation, and growing signs that Belarus is moving to a more contentious Ukraine style relationship with Russia, at least as far as Gazprom is concerned. Although the Belarus row with Russia over gas can be settled for a lot less cash than Ukraine will need to do the same.  Now of course it could just be President Alexander Lukashenko’s realisation that the strategy of being a Moscow-allied strongman has run out of steam. But for a country that even a year ago looked stuck in a geopolitical rut, it’s evidence that things can change.
A Fistful Of Euros
European Opinion
Has Lukashenko been to Montenegro recently? He might have concluded that closer relations to the EU or the West in general are no obstacle to 1) staying friends with Russia and b) staying in power forever.
The consensus is that Lukashenko is playing Russia against the EU for soft loans and any other economic advantages he can get. The other point is that his room for maneuver is small. The EU is not interested in giving Belarus exporters of dairy products access to its internal market. Russia’s leadership is laid back about these activities. Now if Lukashenko applies to join NATO that would be a real crisis.
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Because he would prefer to be President of Byelorus than governor of a Russian province, Lukashenko must play the EU off against Russia. This is a game as old as politics.
Russia offers market access, loans, subsidies, etc., and attaches relatively few political conditions to its aid.
For reasons of its internal politics and official ideology, EU must attach political conditions to any aid, conditions which seriously restrict Lukashenko’s freedom of maneuver. Such aid is also likely to be less generous than that offered by Russia, as Byelorus means much more to Moscow than it does to Brussels.
However, the EU is still a bigger market than Russia and a less immediate threat to Byelorussian state sovereignty.
Its a bigger market in the throes of crisis. Every European leader wants to protect domestic capacity. They want new demand, exports , not new sources of competition, imports. In the long run the EU may provide a better option than Russia. In the short run Russia is probably not just the best bet but the only bet. Germany is the ‘Economic Powerhouse’ of Europe. For every German government a primary strategic relation is its relation with Russia. It may well become Germany’s prime strategic relation.
It is unlikely that the government of Belarus
will be allowed to damage this. The survival of Europe could easily depend on its relationship with Russia. Belarus cannot trump this ace of spades.