Kosovo: a hypothetical question

Because we just can’t get enough.

Imagine the US and Europe went to Putin tomorrow and said, “Vladimir, this Kosovo thing has gone on long enough. We want to get it off the table.

“So, we’ll agree to letting you annex Transnistria and those dangly bits down in Georgia. Abkhazia and, what, South Ossetia, right? All yours — they can join Russia tomorrow. All by free and fair referendum of course, cough cough.

” In return, we want you to sign off on Kosovar independence. No veto, no nothing. And full independence, too — ambassadors, an army, the works.

“Deal?”

Putin: “Da.”

There is a possible concern with China too, but let’s handwave that. [handwave] China very rarely casts a veto anyway anyway — only five times in nearly 40 years — and could probably be bought off with a resolution condemning the Dalai Lama or some such. So say China abstains.

A strong resolution on Kosovar independence flies through both the Security Council and the General Assembly. A Kosovar ambassador would take his seat in the UN a few weeks later.

This would be:

A) Cool. The UN is the most important source of legitimacy in world politics. If the UNSC reaches an agreement, it can grant sovereignty, and that sovereignty is totally valid. Don’t look too closely at how the sausage is made.

B) Evil. Sell out the Georgians and Moldovans to a raw, old-fashioned grab for territory by Putin’s authoritarian and xenophobic Russia? That would be totally immoral.

C) Sensible. The EU has very little interest in Transnistria or Georgia, while Kosovo is a continuing pain in the butt. And Putin’s Russia may be obnoxious, but it’s not going away. Cutting a deal makes sense.

D) Irrelevant. Who cares what the UN says? Kosovar independence is about facts on the ground, not resolutions and recognition.

E) Other.

Discuss.

This entry was posted in A Fistful Of Euros and tagged , , by Douglas Muir. Bookmark the permalink.

About Douglas Muir

American with an Irish passport. Does development work for a big international donor. Has been living in Eastern Europe for the last six years -- first Serbia, then Romania, and now Armenia. Calls himself a Burkean conservative, which would be a liberal in Germany but an unhappy ex-Republican turned Democrat in the US. Husband of Claudia. Parent of Alan, David, Jacob and Leah. Likes birds. Writes Halfway Down The Danube. Writes Halfway Down The Danube.

78 thoughts on “Kosovo: a hypothetical question

  1. The answer is of course D, but also C is pretty close. Kosovo is de facto independent allready, so resolution it cannot do annything.

  2. It would also be paying a premium. Under the Ahtisaari plan, Kosovo isn’t getting sovreignty, it’s getting formal recognition that its colonial overlord is not Serbia, but an international committee.

    The equivalent offer to put on the table before Putin would be recognition that the de facto republics are not an integral part of the polities they split from, and are now to be run by international committee. Since this necessarily dilutes Russia presence in those republics, the deal is not accepted, any more than Turkey would be down with trading recognition of the TRNC for loss of dominion over its colony.

    Just to be impish, I’ll also throw out the what-if that if it seems that Moldova’s loss of Transistria is to be formalized, its government will, just to be spiteful, try to cede it to the Ukrainians.

  3. Good choices, Mr. Doug M. I think D is the answer. While the UN is an important symbolic venue, the truth remains that it is like a President (as opposed to a Prime Minister) in a European country…all the glitter, but no real power. The recognition of Kosova’s independence by the US and the EU would be sufficient to get things going on improving the life of the Kosovars.

    The position that Russia is taking makes no sense. They demand recognition of Kosova’s independce to be precedent for other areas (i.e. S. Ossetia, Transnistria, etc.). Yet, they want it to be a limited precedent so it cannot be applied to Chechnya. Well, if the EU and US (I have lost all hopes on UN) grow some cahones, then they should tell Russia it cannot have it both ways. Only if it wasn’t for that darn oil!!!

    And lastly, I think the appointment of a EU dictator (representative) to Kosova with authority to veto laws and remove officials just gives the Kosovar government the ability to stagnate and blame him/her for all their failures (see Bosnia).

  4. very thought provoking 🙂

    but id say the answer is A,B, C and D. depending ofc on who you ask that is.

  5. C is close. I don’t see the EU going for “no strings attached” independence, though. (The US might.) BTW, did anyone notice that Putin has more or less stopped mentioning Transnistria, concentrating on the two Georgian provinces instead?

  6. B,D.

    The fact of the matter is that D is happening no matter what and selling out the Georgians and Moldovans is not only /evil/, it encourages Putin’s Russia to grab more bits of countries. Like say, the Donbass? or Crimea? Or other bits of southern Ukraine? Or what about Belarus? Or the near abroad? Or what’s to stop /other/ countries from doing something alike? China? Venzuela? For that matter, the USA? Or even the EU in the *handwaves* future?

    No, this is definitely B. Strong B. And D of course. At some point, I assume that the Kosovars will just flip everyone the bird and make the declaration whatever the community thinks. It would probably be postPutin though. ie after 2008.

  7. E. Wait, I thought the Kosovo issue had been resolved. It hasn’t been on the evening news for years!

  8. I don’t know what happened to my previous comment.

    The situations are not comparable, so (b).

    In Kosovo’s case, something like 80%+ of the population (including refugees now living in Serbia) want independence. Serbia controls no part of Kosovo and has already agreed to give up control of Kosovo to NATO/UN for the time being.

    In Abkhazia’s case, also including refugees, only a minority want independence. Also, Georgia controls parts of Abkhazia and would refuse to relinquish them.

    In the case of South Ossetia, it’s impossible to know whether the majority of residents favor independence, since all the votes on separation have not included the sizable Georgian population. Georgia controls about a third of the area (mostly Georgian-inhabited villages). There are actually two distinct administrations that hold sway, one wishes to remain part of Georgia, and the other does not.

    If Russia tried to annex Transdniestra, Ukraine and Moldova could get together and squeeze Trandniestra to total economic ruin in weeks while denying Russia access to it. Not going to happen.

  9. Third try – hopefully it works.

    80% of Kosovars (including refugees in Serbia) support independence. Serbia does not control any part of Kosovo and has already agreed to this.

    Only a minority of Abkhazian residents (including refugees) supports independence. Georgia controls part of Abkhazia and will not give it up.

    It’s unclear whether a majority of inhabitants of South Ossetia support independence, since the Georgians in Abkhazia are excluded from voting. Georgia controls a third of Abkhazia (populated by Georgians) and there are two dueling administrations who control about 2/3 and 1/3 of South Ossetia.

    The situations are not comparable.

  10. Hmm as I see it, Russia’s influence is declining and the EU’s is increasing. If this is the case IMHO it would be better to just wait this one out, as that will put the EU in a better position. Especially since there is no immediate need to have Kosovo independent.

  11. I’d like to throw option F out there, which is to go down the realpolitik alley but keep the Caucasus out of it.

    Propose a straight-up trade to Kostunica et al: Kosovo out of Serbia in exchange for an equivalent chunk of Republika Srpska being added to Serbia.

    The piece of RS put on the block would need to be closely contiguous to Serbia proper (so none of the portions W. of Brčko) and pretty thoroughly Serb. There’d need to be assurances it would remain as a Vojvodina-style province within Serbia with enhanced ethnic minority rights.

    This would be confirmed by simultaneous referenda in the Serblet and Kosovo with nice high yes thresholds (say, 80% yes), and with the assurance for the FBiH that a rump of RS not being added to Serbia proper would get broken into Serb-majority cantons and integrated into FBiH permanently.

    Serbia gets an out, in that they can claim adequate compensation for the loss of Kosovo, and the idea that the populations will be consenting by substantial margins to the new governance arrangements. They can thus consent to the Kosovo independence issue and keep Russia out of the whole affair.

    The RS gang get their wish of a greater Serbia, but at a cost: only parts of RS get to be part of Serbia, and the rest is confirmed as part of a multiethnic BiH.

    The FBiH get their wish of an entity-less governance structure in Bosnia, eliminates the risk of RS getting up and leaving as a whole in a few years time and throwing Sarajevo into contention again, and an ethnic gerrymandering boost that drops the Serb population to be more in line with the Croat population.

    The EU gets the ability to bill this as a one-shot-deal done with the consent of those involved with no need to unfreeze the conflicts in Georgia/Transnistria.

    Certainly creepy overtones of Versailles and folks with waxed moustaches drawing lines on a map, but if we’re getting all utilitarian, certainly worthy of consideration.

  12. I think redrawing the borders in the Balkans based on ethnic lines would truly be a long term solution. I say:

    Give Serbia Republica Srpska, Krajina (and possibly North Kosova).

    Give Albania Kosova, part of South Serbia (Presevo Valley), Albanian populated portion of Macedonia and Albanian populated portion of Montenegro.

    Let Croatia get their portion of Bosnia.

    Bosnia gets to keep their pre-war portion of B&H that was populated by Muslims.

    Macedonia gets reduced to approx. one half its size, but does not have to deal with the Albanians.

    While this is practically impossible to achieve, it would be the best solution that would bring long term peace. It would not hurt to build some really high walls separating all the nations from each other.

  13. KRS:

    As an ideal, nation states do not work unless you are willing to do ethnic cleansing to make them, and then to keep doing it to keep them. In the real world, people (i) start off intermingled, and then (ii) move.

  14. Give Serbia Republica Srpska, Krajina (and possibly North Kosova).

    All of RS, perhaps, but Krajina? From what I know of the demographic and economic facts on the ground, a Serb Krajina is about as plausible as the idea of a German Silesia circa 1955.

    Give Albania Kosova, part of South Serbia (Presevo Valley), Albanian populated portion of Macedonia and Albanian populated portion of Montenegro.

    Do the Albanians of Albania want to annex these territories? Do the Albanians in these territories want to be annexed?

    Let Croatia get their portion of Bosnia.

    Are there enough Croats left?

    Bosnia gets to keep their pre-war portion of B&H that was populated by Muslims.

    Pre-war or post-war borders?

    I’m not sure this could work.

  15. Here’s another messy poker option:

    E – Other: Partition Kosovo (Serbia gets the Serb parts and 250,000 refugees; cultural monuments are moved under UNESCO supervision), Partition Bosnia (because it is still a problem: Republicka Serbska goes to Serbia with agreements on transportation corridors); Russia gets Chechnya, Transnistria, and South Ossetia; Bosnia gets Sandzak and a debt right off by England, Germany, France and America and NATO guarantees of Herzegovina (which are continued); and Albania gets its Albanian Kosovo (debt free because England, Germany, France and America pay it off). The US and England get Albania and Bosnia to donate 20,000 troops each to Iraq. China (what the hell) gets guarantees to Taiwan and donates 40,000 to Iraq and 5,000 to Afganistan.

  16. Just wait it out. Kosovo and Serbia will be part of the Union with a historical very short time. Make regions have more say than countries and who cares then if they are independent.

    ps. Africa is an improtant reason why making Kosovo independent is a problem

  17. Todd is just talking nonsense now…

    Randy – Krajina right now probably has a few Serbs remaining, but that is because they are all refugees in Serbia or were moved to Kosova, and then had to leave again and go to Serbia (part of the 200,000 number that gets thrown around as Kosovar Serbs that left Kosova). My thought was to return them, and that is why I suggested Krajina as an option to join Serbia. Same comment for the Bosnian portion populated by Croats…return the ones that left.

    I meant let Bosnia exist within the borders where Muslims lived before the war and before Serbs took parts of Bosnia they never even knew existed, let alone live there.

    Re the Albanians in all the countries. While I don’t think any of them are pursuing unification actively, they would probably not mind being unified. Just my thought.

    Cyrus – I understand that pure ethnic states are tough to achieve, and by no means am I promoting ethnic cleansing. But in the Balkans, I think vastly homogenous states are doable because ethnic lines are pretty well drawn, of course, with exceptions.

    And please keep in mind that I put a disclaimer in my previous comment “While this is practically impossible to achieve.” My suggestion was just a hypothetical that would lead to long term peace…even though it could never be realized.

  18. E: Division, with the North of Kosovo going to Serbia. Russia doesn’t need South Ossetia/Abkhazia. It already has Chechnya, so that is not even worth discussing.

    The reason for the division is that the Kosovo Albanians can’t be trusted (as proved by their actions from post war 1999 (let us not forget the events of March 2004) to the present day). It doesn’t matter what they say, it’s what the Kosovo Serbs believe. Otherwise, Kosovo will join the other super-pure states in the former SFRY, whilst Serbia will remain one of the most ethnically diverse.

    There certainly are some strange comments made here. “Russia’s influence is declining and the EU’s is increasing”. Where did that come from? Russia’s influence was minimal in the 1990s under that drunkard Yeltsin. Now it’s back…

    &

    “80% of Kosovars (including refugees in Serbia) support independence. Serbia does not control any part of Kosovo and has already agreed to this.” This is just not true. No supporting evidence has been posted, so it is ‘opinion’ rather than ‘fact’.
    Prove it.

    Serbia doesn’t need to link up with the RS. That would only happen if the EU decides to push for the abolition of the RS (as the Bosnian Moslem side wishes).

    The whole point of the EU is lifting the barriers on peoples, goods & services. Serbia already has very strong links with the RS and northern Kosovo. As for the Krajina, the croats have done nothing with it and is to all intents and purposes empty. It hasn’t filled up with croats either.

    The real truth will be in a couple of years when there are still no jobs for 70% of the population in Kosovo. Then there will be even more trouble.

  19. Aleks:

    “Otherwise, Kosovo will join the other super-pure states in the former SFRY, whilst Serbia will remain one of the most ethnically diverse.”

    Actually, judging by Wikipedia’s overview–Wikipedian but still accurate–Serbia is about as ethnically diverse as neighbouring countries like Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria. The Vojvodina province is quite ethnically diverse, but the Serb proportion has risen to more than 60% of the total as a result of the inflow of resettled ethnic Serbs and the outflow of ethnic minorities (the attacks against Croats in the 1990s, and the insecurity of the Magyars at present, both come to mind).

    Take away the Vojvodina, and the population of “inner” Serbia is a bit under 90% ethnically Serb. Since this region includes Belgrade, former capital of a multiethnic federation, the ethnic diversity of the Serbian heartland must be adjusted downwards accordingly.

    “As for the Krajina, the croats have done nothing with it and is to all intents and purposes empty. It hasn’t filled up with croats either.”

    The former Sudetenland is still below its pre-1945 population. Some damage can’t be undone.

  20. Let’s run the numbers. Say 200,000 non-Albanians in Kosovo, and 200,000 refugees in Serbia. If we assume all the non-Albanians vote for staying in Serbia and all the Albanians (1.6 million) vote for independence, then that’s 80% right there. In fact, there have been independence votes among the Albanian population, that are always 95%+ for independence, so there is an overwhelming majority for independence from Serbia. It’s really time for Serbs to face facts on this. Even including refugees from the war, Kosovo is 80%+ Albanian, and they all want independence from Serbia.

    Serbs sort of understand this – that’s why they didn’t bother to try to include Albanians on the rolls for Kosovo in the recent election – they wouldn’t have gotten enough turnout for the constitution to be approved if the Albanians were off the rolls and didn’t vote.

  21. Doug, do we even know that Putin wants to annex slabs of Georgia and that little far off thingummy? The Russian government has already pulled off a virtual annexation by granting citizenship to the residents of the disputed areas and bringing them inside Russia’s tariff wall. While I can certainly imagine that a real annexation would be more emotionally satisfying than a virtual one, I am uncomfortable imputing motives to a government as autonomous as Vladmir Putin’s. What’s the evidence that the Kremlin really cares about the enclaves’ de jure status?

  22. At present, the only former Yugoslav republic that comes close to ethnic ‘purity’ is Slovenia. Croatia is next, but only because many Croatian Serbs have not returned (are unable to return?) to their pre-1995 homes. What’s more, the remaining minority areas tend to be patchy, with significant numbers of the national majority (who’d then become the minority if the region switched sides). So splitting former Yugoslavia up into ‘pure’ ethnic pieces just isn’t going to happen except by means of another round of ethnic cleansing or ‘population exchange’. This is also why splitting Kosovo up isn’t the way forward: however you do it there’ll be some Serbs left in Kosovo and Kosovars/Albanians in Serbia, and their rights will have to be protected somehow.

    For Kosovo, a deal with Putin would be D. Regardless of whether Russia vetoes the UNSC proposal, the US and EU are going to treat Kosovo more and more like an independent country, and that ought to be enough for most purposes.

    As for Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, I’m leaning towards B. I don’t buy Russia’s claims on them at all:

    In Abkhazia the current ethnic mix is the result of the expulsion of the local Georgian population – previously Georgians were in fact the largest ethnic group in Abkhazia by a wide margin. Handing it over to Russia would be tantamount to recognising Russia’s right to expand by means of ethnic cleansing, 1940s-style.

    South Ossetia’s one of those random paint-splatter places when it comes to the distribution of ethnicities, and also de facto control. Also, the ethnic Ossetians themselves are divided in their sympathies between Russia, Georgia and independence, though how much isn’t clear seeing as South Ossetia is not a functioning democracy. Given that its population is much too small to be viable as an independent country, a high degree of autonomy within Georgia would seem to be the only fair solution.

    The Transnistrian situation is just bizarre. The region has almost equal proportions of Russians, Ukrainians and Moldovans. Why are they apparently so keen to join Russia? Also, why does Russia care about this strip of land far removed from its own borders, which is only 30% Russian and has (AFAIK) no major economic or strategic value?

    The strange thing is, there are places where Russia could make much better claims in terms of ethnic groups sympathetic to it, in Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine (especially Crimea) and Kazakhstan. But the last is so pro-Russian that Russia doesn’t mind, and the first three are in a strong enough position that Russia can’t bully them as much. Unfortunately, it seems that neighbouring countries’ ability to resist is the main check on Russian expansionism at the moment, as long as Russia keeps behaving this way, its ambitions will remain strongly antithetical to those of the EU and any countries in the region that want to integrate more with the West. The one exception I can think of is that an effective Russian annexation of Belarus might not be so bad, as the Belarusians seem to have far more affinity for Russia than they do for anywhere else, and even Putin has to be an improvement on Lukashenko.

  23. The answer is D. Russian opportunism and Serbian bluster ultimately matter more on the ground than the loftiest U.N. pronouncement. But that’s the extent of Russo-Serbian hegemony.

    Kosovo is one of the few places where American policy still carries moral weight. As Putin courts that international pariah, Ahmadinejad’s Iran, Washington will weigh in and demand a Kosovo concession. In the shadow of the Iraq war, the Russians have become used to throwing their weight around without consequences, but the war is now for all practical purposes a closed chapter. It behooves Washington to engage elsewhere. The U.S. will almost certainly insist forcefully on Kosovo’s independence, surprising the Russo-Serbian axis.

    Putin won’t just say “Da.” He’ll say “Da! Da! Da!”

  24. F: Nothing will happen. Diplomatic conversations (negotiations) will eternalise. From time to time, a “new” plan will come up, to be rejected by one of the parties, or both. The Ahtisaari plan has already been labelled a “road map”, so we can be sure that it goes the same way as the Israel-Palestine one.

  25. Hektor, you comments are unclear. Rereading them I assume when you speak of ‘kosovar refugees in Serbia’ you mean kosovo albanians. What kosovo albanian refugees???! You provide no details. I’m still stunned that you claim to speak for the Kosovo Serbs though. Is this not quite disingenuous? I see a lot of supposition in your argument, but no hard fact or support for your views (though I don’t doubt that ~95% of kosovo albanians voted for independence).

    It’s been over 15 years since the Kosovo Albanians declared themselves ‘independent’. Even in the most recent Serbian elections, it was touch and go whether the Albanians in Presevo would actually take part. Neither I nor you can say with any certainty that the Kosovo albanians would have taken part. OTOH, that Serbs ‘represented’ in Kosovo are little more than cosmetic fix and are only there because of rules for the representation of minorities as imposed by the ‘International Community’.

    Randy, I thought that Vojvodina is still part of Serbia, or am I wrong? Dunno why you’re mentioning Bg & Ro. I referred to the former SFRY (though I really should have excluded Slovenia as it did not have an actual ‘war’ (but it does have 18,000 ‘erased’ or about 1% http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/slovenia/document.do?id=ENGEUR680042005)
    The official estimates of Roma in Serbia is ~150,000 according to Wikipedia. The real numbers claimed are 500,000:

    “According to official national figures, 108,193 Roma make up less than 2 per cent of Serbia’s total population. Unofficially, however, the number of Roma is estimated at about 500,000.”
    http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/serbia_36662.html

    Reports from Montenegro say that the government is kicking out the Kosovo Roma refugees there to Serbia (is this actually true?). Why don’t they return to Kosovo???

    While I certainly don’t trust Putin, who would trust a spook? what on earth can the US/EU offer Putin in return that he actually needs considering Russia’s extremely strong economic and political standing? Does Putin really have a price and would he trust the West?

  26. Aleks,

    I’m talking about non-Albanian refugees from Kosovo in Serbia. If we accept 200,000 of them and 200,000 non-Albanians still in Kosovo, that’s still only 20% of the populations, and it might be an overestimate. (And that’s including everybody: Serbs, Vlachs, Romany, Gorani, “Bosniaks”, etc.) So yes, 80%+ of the Kosovo population, including refugees in Serbia, supports independence.

  27. Aleks:

    “I thought that Vojvodina is still part of Serbia, or am I wrong?”

    Yes. If we’re comparing the different federal units of the former SFRY, then–purely for consistency’s sake–Vojvodina should be considered separately from inner Serbia.

    This goes to the contentious claim that you made above:

    “Kosovo will join the other super-pure states in the former SFRY, whilst Serbia will remain one of the most ethnically diverse.”

    This is inaccurate. Croatia

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatia#Demographics

    is nearly 90% Croat by population, true, and Kosova appears to be roughly as homogeneously Albanian. This makes these territories somewhat more ethnically homogeneous than Serbia in toto, and about as homogeneous as inner Serbia.

    The other ex-Yugoslav republics, though, are as ethnically diverse as Serbia. Slovenia is

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovenia#Demographics

    83% Slovene by population, Macedonia is

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Macedonia#Demographics

    64% Macedonian and one-quarter Albanian by population, and Bosnia is a country with no ethnic plurality.

    “Dunno why you’re mentioning Bg & Ro.”

    They’re both Balkan countries with a history of Communism and nationalism; they’re good pairs.

    Romania is as homogeneous as Croatia

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania#Demographics

    90% Romanian according to official statistics. However, Romania’s size gives it large minorities, not least of which are the two million Magyars. Bulgaria, in the meantime

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgaria#Demographics

    is also as ethnically homogeneous as Serbia, with Turkish, Pomak, and Romany minorities amounting to perhaps one-sixth of the total population.

    Serbia doesn’t stand out as being particularly ethnically diverse by the standards of the other Yugoslav successor states, or in comparison to other Balkan states. If anything, absent the anomaly of Vojvodina–a territory placed under the direct rule of Belgrade only in the late 1980s and historically separate from inner Serbia–Serbia would constitute one of the _more_ ethnically homogeneous states in the Balkans.

    Certainly, claiming the existence of numerous minorities concentrated in Vojvodina as evidence of a uniquely Serbian tolerance doesn’t make sense, especially since the demographic history of the region

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Vojvodina

    is basically one of the decline, slow and otherwise, of non-Serb minority groups and the growth of a Serb majority.

  28. E) The most pragmatic and advantageous solution for Serbia would be to grant Kosovo independence. Just imagine how many problems this would rid them of.
    But, what kind of message would that be sending to the world? Should any ethnic group with a sizable majority in a certain region of any country be given independence just because they are getting impatient and are threatening (and using) violence?
    This isn’t how problems should be solved. If it was, then Europe would have twice as many countries as it does. I don’t see any reason why the Albanians couldn’t be content with having an autonomous region within Serbia. An independent Kosovo will just be a second Albania where corruption, crime, weapons and drug smuggling, and human trafficking will be ignored and even aided by the government.
    Maybe for once they could learn how to live with others instead of having to fence off every square foot of territory to keep others out.
    Creating ever smaller statelets and more and more borders will only create problems in the future…

  29. Jon,

    “I don’t see any reason why the Albanians couldn’t be content with having an autonomous region within Serbia.”

    Here’s a reason: Kosova autonomy within (under) Serbia equals:

    > 10,000 Albanians dead
    > 2,000+ Albanians missing
    > 800,000 Albanians displaced (refugees)
    > Hundreds of thousands of Albanians immigrants that left Kosova to avoid persecution (US, Europe, etc.)
    > Decades of persecution and treatment as second class citizens
    > 40% of the country destroyed (and don’t give me the “NATO did it b.s.” b/c NATO rebuilt everything they destroyed and most of that destroyed by the Serbs)
    > Economic stagnation

    I can’t imagine independence doing much worse than that.

  30. KRS-

    Those are the results of KLA’s war for independence, because none of this happened before they started raiding police stations, killing JNA soldiers, and rioting.
    The Albanians themselves were in a pretty destructive mood for decades preceding the 90s.

    But, putting all that aside, today’s government in Serbia is nothing compared to that of Milosevic’s, and I don’t think anybody would mind a group of 2 million people living peacefully in the south of their country. Nations do, however, have a problem with armed rebel groups living in their country, and as history has shown, for better or for worse, they panic and turn to military power to repress rebellions.

    BTW, just a question for you, where does the “a” in Kosova come from? I was always intrigued by that. I have read that Kosovo got its name from the blackbirds that inhabit Kosovo Polje. Kos means blackbird in Serbian, Kosovo Polje means field of the blackbirds, or just shortened to Kosovo.
    So if Albanians do get independence, will they also reject the Serbian name for the province and call it Dardania instead?

  31. Jon I dont think its realistic to expect Kosovo Albanians to want to live in Serbia even if I think that Kosovo Serbs are in far worse danger today than Kosovo Albanians are.

    Or in other words I find it sad that Kosovo Albanians dont ever talk about the human rights situation in Kosovo today for minorities. That shows that the defence of Kosovo Albanians in the 90’s was not based on human rights but on nationalism – the desire for a Kosovo Albanian state.

    KRS your arguments are against Serbia 1990’s policy. I was also against that policy but those arguments were much more effective nearly a decade ago.

    As for economic stagnation Kosovo will face less economic stagnation with Serbian investment than it will do without. Any regional economist (apart from the haters) would tell you that.

  32. Dear Jon,

    Where does the “a” in Americ*a* or Canad*a* or Bulgari*a* or Sloveni*a* come from?

    When you tell us where does that “a” come from you will get the answer to your question.

    Regards,

    Fidel

  33. bganon:

    “KRS your arguments are against Serbia 1990’s policy. I was also against that policy but those arguments were much more effective nearly a decade ago.”

    Very well. Who, in Serbia, has apologized for the decades of past mistreatment, culminating in the 1999 ravaging of the province?

    “As for economic stagnation Kosovo will face less economic stagnation with Serbian investment than it will do without. Any regional economist (apart from the haters) would tell you that.”

    What investment moneys? Serbia can barely finance it

  34. “Those are the results of KLA’s war for independence, because none of this happened before they started raiding police stations, killing JNA soldiers, and rioting.
    The Albanians themselves were in a pretty destructive mood for decades preceding the 90s.”

    This argument is weak, although often emphasized by Slobo supporters. To be sure, the atrocities against the Albanians predate the KLA origins (1991 or so). There’s no need to list them all. Also, asking for equality does not make one destructive (see India/GB, civil rights movement in the US, etc.)

    “Or in other words I find it sad that Kosovo Albanians dont ever talk about the human rights situation in Kosovo today for minorities. That shows that the defence of Kosovo Albanians in the 90’s was not based on human rights but on nationalism – the desire for a Kosovo Albanian state.”

    I have to admit that the Serbs in Kosova have my deepest sympathies for their current conditions. Many of them participated in the atrocities against their Albanian neighbors, however, many did not. And, for the sake of reconciliation, they should all be spared of consequences for their war-time sins. Nevertheless, the situation of the Kosovar Serbs is certainly something that can be attributed to the regime in Belgrade. The fact that Belgrade insists on using Kosovar Serbs for their delusional aims, makes their life a living hell. Being indoctrinated into the society in which they now live, would make the Albanians begin accepting them (which will take time) and eventually coexist without any problems. That does not mean that they agree with Kosova being independent, but would simply entitle them to a normal life.

    The evidence for what I say is ample. With the exception of North Mitrovica, which is overrun by remnants of the old regime, the rest of Kosova has experienced significant improvement in the Serb-Albanian relations. Serbs regularly sell their products in Albanian markets, regularly travel to Prishtina and other cities and are employed in the Kosova institutions (some of them were in fact getting double salaries, one from the Kosova gov’t and another from Belgrade). The other good news is that the new Ahtisaari plan gives Serbs and the Orthodox Church preferential treatment (Kosovar version of affirmative action).

    As far as Kosova/o issue goes. Call it whatever you want, I really don’t care. I’ll call it Kosova, if that’s ok with you. Dardania is very unlikely to resurface b/c it did not get enough support by the Kosovar’s when the late President Rugova mentioned the idea.

    “KRS your arguments are against Serbia 1990’s policy. I was also against that policy but those arguments were much more effective nearly a decade ago.”

    My arguments are unfortunately still valid. Besides not apologizing, Serbia is still run by the same type of people. They still refer to Albanians as “Shiptari” (a derogatory term) as opposed to “Albanci.” Changing their terminology would probably hide their true intentions better. Radicals, whose dobrovoljci committed atrocities all over the Balkans, still won the largest portion of the Serb parliament seats. The so called democrats won the majority of the votes, however, we would all be fooled if we believed that Kostunica was not a radical at heart. His rhetoric during visits to Kosova is eerily similar to Slobo’s speech in 1989. He’s simply a wolfe in sheep’s clothing. Tadic is the only powerful politician in Belgrade that is worth anything.

    “As for economic stagnation Kosovo will face less economic stagnation with Serbian investment than it will do without. Any regional economist (apart from the haters) would tell you that.”

    Thank God that Serbian leadership has Kosova because otherwise, it might have to explain to its people why their lives are not improving. Understand please that Serbia no longer has a monopoly over federal dinars to say that we’re better off together. Serbia can barely sustain itself, let alone help Kosova out. Who are you kidding? Any economist that would say that Kosova is better of with Serbia than alone is clearly smoking something.

  35. Well Fidel,
    America was never Americo. Canada was never Canado. Bulgaria was never Bulgario. Slovenia was never Slovenio.
    Kosovo?
    I think it was legitimate question. The whole world uses the original name Kosovo while only Albanians use Kosov”a”. Since the name is of Serbian origin, I was just wondering if there are any plans by Albanian politicians, historians, linguists, anyone, to change the name of the province to Dardania, which I heard was the Albanian name for the region in question. Correct me if I’m wrong, but it even says Dardania on a proposed flag for an independent Kosovo.

    -Jon

  36. The answer is E – unlikely. Russia isn’t interested in solving the frozen conflicts in Georgia etc, it’s interested in keeping them as leverage. So any such offer would simply be turned down. So in a way the ensuing discussion is a bit irrelevant, as the question is what the international community can offer that Russia might want in order to get them to sign off on Kosovo.

  37. Randy you will find that my arguments are pretty much rational, whether you accept my life view or not is another matter. Here goes.

    ‘Very well. Who, in Serbia, has apologized for the decades of past mistreatment, culminating in the 1999 ravaging of the province?’

    Who would you expect to apologise for this?
    Am I to apologize for what happened, even though I was against it, even though I feared for any civilians facing men with guns?

    Or perhaps you would prefer a politician to apologize? President Boris Tadic maybe? Even though Boris Tadic was against this and in all likelyhood would have conducted a different policy. Vojislav Kostunica perhaps? Well at last we get to somebody who bears some moral responsibility for what happened. His type of nationalism condones these actions tacitly or not. And yet he didnt order the troops in and as far as I know, never killed anybody. But killers who truly did something wrong should apologize, I agree with that. I dont hold out much hope that most Kosovo Albanian political leaders will ever do that.

    On the other hand you may think that somebody should apologize in the name of his people. I am against this (in my view) primative type of thinking that a person from a certain ethnic group can apologize for the sins of those from the same ethnic group. I find that somewhat ridiculous. People are individuals not members of an imagined community (Anderson). Why would I or you apologize for something we didnt do, worse still something we were against?

    ‘What investment moneys? Serbia can barely finance it?’

    What makes you think I’m talking about the state? Of course I’m not, I’m talking about businessmen. Serbia has some of the richest and most succesful businessmen in the region (thats not such a good thing really as money is concentrated in the hands of few, rather than in Slovenia for example where many businessmen are very succesful but those at the top are not so far ahead). Kosovo needs investment from Serbia as it also needs investment from Albania and other neighbours. I dont see the problem in stating that fact.

    If you are interested in the states economic activities in Kosovo see this page:

    http://www.ekonomskitim.sr.gov.yu/index_eng.php

    KRS
    ‘My arguments are unfortunately still valid’.

    Well in that case the argument of Serbian fear from the ‘ustase’ in 1990 Croatia was also valid and their reaction justified. Or are arguments valid for 10 years but not for 50, or perhaps do arguments of that kind get more or less valid over time?

    At any rate what cannot be disputed is the today which we can change. The today in Kosovo is that minorities are repressed. Now I dont see that many people that spoke about human rights in the Balkans talking about their rights today.

    By the way if ‘Many of them participated in the atrocities against their Albanian neighbors’ is your attempt at an apology for todays situation – that is still continuing you can save it.

    For me personally an apology has to be genuine not tempered with excuses and condoning current behaviour in a historical context. Plus unless you are guilty of condoning the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo, there is no need to apologize.

    ‘Thank God that Serbian leadership has Kosova because otherwise, it might have to explain to its people why their lives are not improving.’

    I have news for you, lives in Serbia are improving, look at the statistics. Sadly those at the bottom of the pile are suffering but the rest of us arent doing too badly. Yes I agree there is an economic argument that Serbia is better off without Kosovo it will be even better once we dont have to continue to pay Kosovo debts 🙂

    You know KRS you really dont sound ready, personally for independence. Almost every comment you have made on these issue includes a dig at Serbs or Serbia. You need to think more with your head and not with your gut. It is thinking with the gut that will continue to cripple the Balkans, in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Croatia and elsewhere. It is thinking with the gut that allows one to be somebody elses victim – the kind of victim you believe that Belgrade is making of Kosovo Serbs.

  38. bganon:

    “Or perhaps you would prefer a politician to apologize? President Boris Tadic maybe? Even though Boris Tadic was against this and in all likelyhood would have conducted a different policy. Vojislav Kostunica perhaps? Well at last we get to somebody who bears some moral responsibility for what happened. His type of nationalism condones these actions tacitly or not. And yet he didnt order the troops in and as far as I know, never killed anybody. But killers who truly did something wrong should apologize, I agree with that. I dont hold out much hope that most Kosovo Albanian political leaders will ever do that.”

    Willi Brandt didn’t serve in the German army; he certainly wasn’t personally responsible for any atrocity committed in Poland. Yet, he went on his knees before the memorial to the Warsaw uprising in Poland and apologized.

    Here, perhaps something on the lines of an apology for the anti-Albanian nationalism pioneered in the 1985 memorandum, the suspension of Kosovar self-government and the initiation of an apartheid regime, the massacre of thousands and the expulsion of half the population in 1999, and the continued existence of a Serbian popular discourse that denies Albanians any rights to their homeland, would be appropriate.

    “Kosovo needs investment from Serbia as it also needs investment from Albania and other neighbours. I dont see the problem in stating that fact.”

    So, a Serbia that’s barely ahead of Albania in terms of GDP per capita and has a lot of oligarchs is willing to massively fund Kosovar economic development, just as in the 1970s and 1980s?

  39. More to the point, bganon, I’m concerned by the self-serving inflexibility of your worldview. What moral claim does Belgrade have to sovereignty over Kosovo and its inhabitants, especially after the events of 1999? Yes, people in Serbia might now feel bad about what happened then (though, notably, they did very little to stop the atrocities, and many might not feel bad about what happened besides), but is that enough?

  40. ‘Also, asking for equality does not make one destructive (see India/GB, civil rights movement in the US, etc.)’

    You’re comparing peaceful movements for civil rights and independence from colonialism to what happened in Kosovo? There is absolutely no comparison there.

    1974 – Kosovo gets autonomy.
    1981 – Separatist riots ensue.

    I have no problem with a province where 90% of the population wants independence becoming independent.
    But, this has to happen in a peaceful manner, not in an atmosphere of violence and utter disrespect for human rights. Not to mention rampant crime and corruption.
    When the conditions exist that the Albanian authorities of an independent Kosovo can respect the human rights of its inhabitants, its historical heritage, and guarantee equal rights to everyone, then let it become independent. But threatening violence is no way to behave when you want recognition that you can be a responsible independent state.

  41. KOSOVA will become independent wheather HATERS like it or not, IT IS AS CERTAIN AS THE SUN WILL RISE TOMMORROW.

    Both USA and Israel support Kosova’s independence.

    LET THE DOGS HOWL THE CARAVAN MOVES ON.

  42. The way the Sub Continent gained independence was not peacefull. It only gained independence after the Indian army rebelled. Ghandi was a fool and without the non-violent dithering the famine wouldn’t have happened.

  43. Dear Jon,

    The whole world uses the name Kosovo purely because Kosovo was under Serb control (occupation if you’re Kosovar) and thus they were using the Serbian name. The world only learned about Kosovo during the time that it was under Serbian control (occupation), and I can assure you that if it was under Albanian control the whole world would use the name Kosova, just like America, Canada, Romania, etc.

    There are two names for Kosovo, the Albanian name Kosova and the Serbian name Kosovo. There is no such thing as the world’s name for Kosovo.

    To best illustrate my point look at the name of cities in India, examples like “Bangalore” (read the story at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-10-25-bangalore_x.htm) and the same goes for cities in the South Africa. The whole world were using the name English names for these cities because they were under English control (occupation), but now that is changing.

    The same goes for Kosovo. It is very likely that a few years down the line the whole world will be using the name Kosova, as the vast majority of population calls the country they live in.

    Finally, there are many places (villages) in the world that are called Kosova (in Estonia, Turkey, Slovakia, etc.) and I would like to hear what does these names mean. Sometimes a name is just a name, it might not have a particular meaning, so it does not automatically mean that the word Kosovo has a Serbian meaning. The people of Kosovo do not feel that the name is Serbian and do not feel like they need to change the name of their country.

    However, personally, I think the name Dardania sounds better, but that does not mean that the people of Kosovo will want to change the name to Dardania.

  44. Dear Jon,

    You seem to be very misinformed. I just read your last post stating the following:

    “You’re comparing peaceful movements for civil rights and independence from colonialism to what happened in Kosovo? There is absolutely no comparison there.”

    There was an incredible non-violent civilian resistance to Serbian nationalism in Kosovo led by the late President Ibrahim Rugova.

    If you are interested to learn more about this topic, I would recommend the following book: Civil Resistance in Kosovo by Howard Clark (

    You can anything you like, but directly or indirectly defending the Serbian nationalism of 1990s led by Milosevic et al will position you against not only most of the world’s opinion, but also against the opinion of very many Serbs today. And, believe you me, you cannot be more clever or intelligent than the most of the world together.

    Greetings.

  45. Fidel,

    The last thing I want to do is defend the actions, policies, or even the ideals held by Milosevic in the 1990s. I am not making excuses for him, neither directly nor indirectly.
    Thank you for recommending that book, but I have read countless books on the subject and I am familiar with the opinions of all sides in the conflict.
    I know going back to the past is getting off subject because we should be talking about the future of Kosovo here. But, I would like to make the point that the Kosovo province has long history of violence, and that you cannot blame the Serbs for everything. In fact, before Milosevic (pre-1990s), Albanians hated the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia and (understandably) felt out of place because the rest of the population was of Slavic origin and Albanians were not.
    The reason I’m bringing this up is because this long history of hate and violence continues to this day (look at videos from the March 2003 riots, with Albanians ripping off crosses from Christian churches), and until that primitive mentality changes, I don’t think Kosovo will be ready to enter the world scene as an independent state, and if it does become independent prematurely, we will be looking at another basket case state in Europe.

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