Here’s an audio link for a change. NPR’s Sylvia Poggioli reports on changing family patterns in Italy. The report I would suggest is pretty ‘fair and balanced’. As a side issue I think she nicely draws attention to the way ‘gender equality issues’ and unequal family caring responsibilities may impact the ability of Southern european societies to meet the ‘new’ female participation objectives I posted about yesterday.
A Fistful Of Euros
European Opinion
Why focus of “Southern Europe”? Sweden is generally considered to be the most family-friendly country in Europe, and it has a substantially-below-replacement birth rate. Russia is the country that the demographers predict will crash most severely (see this week’s New Yorker).
Irrespective of how “gender equality issues” hurt birth rates, it hardly seems a worthwhile avenue to pursue, if the goal is to increase birth rates.
“Sweden is generally considered to be the most family-friendly country in Europe, and it has a substantially-below-replacement birth rate.”
Um, no. Not at all.
I’m happy to be corrected, but I have often seen Sweden held up as a model. To which part is the “Um, no” directed?
From the New York Times
“At 33, she is in full pursuit of an academic career. And despite the fact that she lives in Sweden — which provides more support for women who want families than any other country — Ms. Hulton doesn’t see how she can possibly make room in her life for babies. Someday maybe, but certainly not soon.”
“Sweden spends 10 times as much as Italy or Spain on programs intended to support families. It spends nearly three times as much per person on such programs as the United States.”
Here’s Mothering Magazine’s “More than Welcome: Families Come First in Sweden”. Not quite hard-hitting, but the facts are all there.
It is unclear to me how much of the birthrate reduction is real and how much is statistical because decisions to put off having children to a later age is recent. At some point many of those now waiting will start having babies.
One issue I’ve never seen addressed is the likely effects of older people in the workplace. Many articles, including Sylvia’s report, blindly state that people will be working until 70 or 75 years in the not so distant future. This is a wonderful idea, and I’m absolutely convinced that many/most 65 year olds will be very happy to be doing something useful in addition to tending the garden and enjoying the pub. But, what! In today’s world unemployed professionals over 50 years old have very low expectations of finding decent work, over 56 and you can forget it. In some industries, such as IT, the cut-off point for many companies is around 40. (Age discrimination against the rules? You must be joking.)
This is not for want of trying. A couple of stories in the British press this week highlight the plights of two highly qualified recent retirees, one a headmaster and one a physics researcher, who want to work teaching but cannot because their qualifications don’t meet the current requirements. Experience, it seems, is no substitute for paperwork.
Now fast forward to working to 75. Doing what?
Working at Walmarkt
“It is unclear to me how much of the birthrate reduction is real and how much is statistical because decisions to put off having children to a later age is recent. At some point many of those now waiting will start having babies.”
This is a really important issue. The main problem is that the time scale is long (comparable in some ways to the climatic question, where we read projections about what may happen in 100 years, which seems so far away that we don’t feel any pressure or any capacity to react).
I have reached the conclusion that the demographic transition is one long sweep, which was initially kicked off by a small drop in the age at having the first child in the UK in the late 18th century and then spread across the rest of Europe and then outwards from there.
Essentially, and as we all know, there is an initial explosion in population and then a systematic decline. This is all part of one process.
You are right that the statistics on fertility and mortality are a composite. You have the three factors working at once to produce ageing societies: postponment of first child, less children on average and increased life expectancy.
Age at having the first child is certainly rising. The important point is that this is still continuing, and, like the other issue of life expectancy, we don’t know how this will project going forward.
Many demographers assume that this process can continue for another fifty years or so, but this is only a projection.
So whilst those in one generation will eventually have children (although not at the 2.1 average replacement rate) those coming behind may have the first child slighly later again.
“if the goal is to increase birth rates.”
This is a goal, but at present there is no evidence anywhere that the issue can be resolved satisfactorily.
“Why focus of “Southern Europe”?”
I wouldn’t only want to do that, but there are special issues in the south that need to be addressed.
In particular they have entered the second stage of the transition later, and it is happening more rapidly. At present countries like Italy and Spain are some of the most rapidly ageing on the planet.
They also have less accumulated welfare and pensions resources with which to confront the problem. Here they are simply an indication of a forthcoming problem as this process extends through the third world countries.
“Russia is the country that the demographers predict will crash most severely”
Don’t disagree that Russia is a potential nightmare case. All the former Eastern bloc countries have a ‘demographic path’ which is unusual and a product of their ‘special historic legacy’. Basically they have all arrived at the far end of the transition BEFORE achieving OECD type living standards.
“In some industries, such as IT, the cut-off point for many companies is around 40. (Age discrimination against the rules? You must be joking.)
Now fast forward to working to 75. Doing what?”
Good point, and again I entirely agree. The evidence from Japan (where people now routinely leave their ‘lifelong’ (and relatively well paid job) at 55 and continue to work in a ‘second career’ – often till 75 – is that the wages and living standards are a lot lower. So this is bound to impact on national gdp per capita eventually.
Bottom line: no easy answers.
So this is bound to impact on national gdp per capita eventually.
I’m afraid I don’t understand. I assume you mean a negative effect on gdp however, if money paid out in pension is replaced by money earned and tax paid, even if the same nett amount, this will give a positive boost to gdp. Or, am I missing something?
Working at Walmarkt
Bottom line: no easy answers.
I know a number of stores in Britain target over 55’s as a small proportion of the workforce and perhaps, given c’s spelling of Walmarkt, the same is true in Germany. This is a great idea and I’m sure it will be expanded after showing its worth. But, by themselves, shops only scratch the surface. There is no easy answer, but there is one easy step in the right direction: governments can point the way by doing the same thing as the stores with their workforce. Advantages abound: reducing the long term unemployed; reduced health care costs (older people often become sick when stopping work); friendlier service (older people are generally more patient); reduced staff turnover; introduction of business mentality to public processes and so on.
Frans – where are you when we need you?
To most of us, these issue seem a long way from affecting our daily lives but, have you noticed, every year goes a little bit faster than the previous…
“statistics on fertility and mortality are a composite”.
Commenting here on my own comment. It occurs to me that I may not have made something clear (there are, after all, ‘lies, damn lies, and statistics :)). What matters here aren’t the statistical measures, but the ‘facts on the ground’. In this case these would be: size of the various age cohorts, average age of your population, and proportion of your population of working age. These are real and measureable. But they are a direct ‘output’ from the weird statistical composite.
“I’m afraid I don’t understand.”
Ok this is fair enough. I’m not sure I do completely :).
The thinking here is as follows. Deriving productivity numbers is a strange and almost mystical procedure. One rough and ready measure of the productivity of an entire economy is the gdp per-capita reading. Now if you have an increasing proportion of your workforce in the 55 to 75 age range, and if their earning capacity (or net worth) is less than that of those in the 35 to 55 age band, then your global gdp per capita reading will be affected, and reduce.
This is simply a read-off from the rising average age of a society.
Now the point you raise is a slighly different one, that it is better to have people working than not. I entirely agree. This is GDP per-capita positive. This is the whole post-Lisbon issue of raising participation rates. I am completely in favour of this. All I am saying is that this won’t be an easy ride. (Blood, sweat, toil and tears?).
“but, have you noticed, every year goes a little bit faster than the previous…”
You’re getting the message :).
Now if you have an increasing proportion of your workforce in the 55 to 75 age range, and if their earning capacity (or net worth) is less than that of those in the 35 to 55 age band, then your global gdp per capita reading will be affected, and reduce.
However, those alive will live that little bit longer than the previous year’s aggregation and therefore produce more in their lifetimes.
You’re getting the message :).
Sadly, I got the message a good while back. :<
Well,
I can?t let a debate concerning swedish birthrates alone. I got some good swedish statistics (in swedish, but the numbers are the same) that says that you are both right. Sweden has a substantially-below-replacement birth rate (1,65 children/female) and so does every country in europe except Turkey, Ireland and probably Albania .
However, Italy is way worse of with just 1,23 children/ female. Generally the nordic countries, the benelux, France and Great Britain is high (over 1,6) and the eastern europe and southern europe is low (below 1,5).
If you like to check the chart you should now that to the far right of the chart is the TFR, total fertility rate of all european countries for 2002. The original source is the european council, but the link appear to be broken.
So my conclusion is that social benefits for mothers gives more children, however not enough for the 2,1 that is required for replacement.
Apparently given the choice the typical after-demographic-female choose to have less than 2 children which in the long run is good news for the planet, but locally bad news for Europe. So to echo a common theme on this site: We need more immigration. And we need Turkey. At least.
It costs money to let people work and an increased supply decreases wages so i have my doubts about it being economicly wish that old people work.
“So my conclusion is that social benefits for mothers gives more children, however not enough for the 2,1 that is required for replacement.”
Thanks for the data. I agree with your conclusion. There are strong social welfare arguments for offering child support, but there is little real evidence that it influences long term fertility rates.
“So to echo a common theme on this site: We need more immigration. And we need Turkey. At least.”
Couldn’t have put it better myself:).
I think it may be worth mentioning that those in the ‘southern group’ with rates around 1.2 and 1,3 may benefit a little from Michael’s original statistical element. Their fertility should rise slightly in the coming years. This will also be influenced by the fact that Spain and Italy are both recieving substantial immigration (Spain more or less positively, Italy reluctantly) and since many of the new immigrants are women of child bearing age (and also may tend to have children earlier). So I would expect birth rates to rise slighly from these historic minima (this does not, please note, apply to Eastern Europe where the whole process is different).
“However, those alive will live that little bit longer than the previous year’s aggregation and therefore produce more in their lifetimes.”
This is true. There are pluses and minuses here. What you need is a composite result.
I’m not trying to be obtuse here, but when you balance the positive effect of working more years, with the negative effect of a higher proportion of those working being on a lower real income level, my estimate is that the net result is negative.
Obviously it all depends on how many extra jobs you produce, the value of the ‘dependency ratio’ (ie those outside the working age bands to those inside), and those recently highlighted participation rates.
I am sticking my neck out based on the recent evidence from Japan. Since the current restructuring seems to indicate that Germany is now entering the same dynamic, we may not have to wait too long to have the picture a bit clearer.
“It costs money to let people work and an increased supply decreases wages so i have my doubts about it being economicly wish that old people work.”
Not sure what you have in mind exactly with the first point, but on the second, as the old song says: ‘it ain’t necessarily so’.
Basically whether increased labour supply works or not as a remedy depends on demand conditions and growth. The strong argument for the structural reforms is that by reducing wages you can stimulate job creation and hence promote employment to such an extent that overall economic welfare rises.
Personally, given the deep-structural nature of the German ‘problem’, I have my doubts as to whether this ‘happy ending’ will follow from the ‘mix’ that is being served in Germany (which is obviously going to be the ‘test case’), but there are many ready to disagree with me, so it is far from an ‘open and shut’ issue.