Everyone’s been terribly worried about France. First of all, last autumn’s carburning outbreak saw a lot of people who really ought to know better gathering to hail the end of days and the Islamofascist conquest of Eurabia, or something. Now, the students are out on the streets to protest the government’s new labour laws, and perhaps the trade unions will be coming too. And then there was the supposedly anti-semitic stabbing of a few weeks ago.
That stabbing, one will remember, brought thousands onto the streets for a heavily earnest, government supported demonstration against antisemitism, terrorism and a few other isms. I’m usually very sceptical about demos like that, and the Spanish tradition of demonstrating against terrorists-they aren’t listening, after all, and it is always worryingly close to demonstrating in favour of the government. There’s a strong case that one shouldn’t take part in a modern version of the demos by (supposedly) torpedoed merchant seamen that Winston Churchill put on in the first world war to shame strikers.
But is there more use to it than I think? (More, and more sense, below the fold..)
Since the carburning pseudo-crisis, there have been (largely unreported) signs that the French republic is indeed dealing with its conflicts in its own way. Le Monde reported back in January, in a story completely unrelayed into the anglosphere (and, for that matter, the blogosphere), that a huge surge of people in the Paris suburbs and similar places had registered to vote. Who they will vote for is another matter, but it’s already very different from a “French intifada” or some such nonsense.
So – is citizenship more of a performative act (hell, enough gabble – a performance) that we think? Does the theatre of citizenship actually work? It was always clear that much of the French doomboosting was absurd-for example, does Thomas P.M. Barnett, usually clueful, really believe that France is the most likely country to leave the “core” of highly integrated democracies? I would have thought a state with France’s export base, nuclear/hydro energy solution, democratic polity and reasonably favourable demographics would be about the least likely to go “gap”.
The problem is, I think, not just one of the absurd demonisation campaign that flourished to such a weird extent in the US immediately before the war with Iraq (is that the first example in history of war fever directed against a nation other than the enemy?), although no doubt some people believed it, but of a deep difference in what public life is seen to be like. Whether it’s internal, or performed..
One thing that’s gone largely unreported about the recent carburnings is that they were mainly a matter of degree. In other words, for reasons I don’t pretend to understand, car arson has long been quite popular in France, basically there was just a temporary escalation in its popularity.
“supposedly anti-semitic stabbing”…
My God are you people awful. It wasn’t just a stabbing… it was torture and mutilation of the most heinous sort. Dismissing it like a common mugging *is* the stuff of the anti-semite, because your flippancy is based upon your own hatred of Jews.
There is no excuse for it. Have the balls to call what it is, rather than try to downplay the cancer in your midst.
“My God are you people awful. It wasn’t just a stabbing… it was torture and mutilation of the most heinous sort. Dismissing it like a common mugging *is* the stuff of the anti-semite, because your flippancy is based upon your own hatred of Jews.”
As far as can be determined, the gang that kidnapped and murdered the Jewish man did so not because they hated Jews _per se_, but because they figured all Jews are wealthy and therefore they’d be able to collect a large ransom.
Whether that qualifies as “anti-Semitism” is a matter of debate.
Believing all Jews are wealthy is perilously close to anti-Semitism – after all, that is part of the classic theory.
Calling what happened to Halimi a “stabbing” is definitely downplaying it. A more accurate version is “kidnapping, confinement, psychological and physical torture, followed by wounds designed to cause a painful and lingering death”. Hardly a “stabbing”, which makes it sound like a chance encounter on the street. Also, remember that a lot of the people in the housing project involved knew they were keeping a “Jew” prisoner down there, and because of that fact, chose not to call the police.
It also seems pretty clear to me that you don’t think it “was a matter of debate”. You think it wasn’t anti-Semitism at all.
Large demonstrations have had an effect on the political process in Spain – but two can play at that game. After all, large demonstrations against the PP after their claims of an ETA attack brought down that government.
I don’t think the rally following the Halimi murder was directed at terrorism per se – it was much more directed at anti-Semitism, which is a real problem in France.
There is some reason to debate whether Halimi’s murder was a case of anti-Semitism because, as far as can be determined by media reports, the gang’s motives in choosing a Jewish victim were wholly mercenary. If they had thought that, say, all Turkish immigrants were wealthy, they would have chosen one. Though I agree that the Jews = money assumption is itself getting close to anti-Semitism.
I have some doubts as to the non-involvement of the other residents in the housing project. It sounds quite similar to the Kitty Genovese scenario, believed for years to be a classic case of indifference to helpless crime victims but later largely debunked.
Baseless and frankly loony accusations of anti-semitism are a bannable offense. Some bloggers are more forgiving when abuse is directed to themselves (or in this case one of us) rather than commenters, but it has the same effect on the general discourse.
No, he’s right. You people are awful. Ilan was tortured for a period of 20 days. He suffered multiple stab wounds and acid burns to 80% of his body. He was left naked and dying on the side of a road. The sole reason he died is because the Barbarians thought he was a wealthy Jewish boy. I’m horrified that you people can’t see that this was a racist and anti-semitic hate crime.
It does sound like a hate crime to me.
“It also seems pretty clear to me that you don’t think it “was a matter of debateâ€. You think it wasn’t anti-Semitism at all.”
That was unfounded, and uncivil.
My point, Guillaume, is that it was a crime – not a chip in some vast geopolitical contest (“The Barbarians”, no less – I thought that was a rugby team), not a screaming indictment of something whateveritwas ditto blah. I don’t think “traveller”, for example, has thought of it as a real event involving people at all – just a debating point to hurl back at insufficiently rightwing voices.
Was it any more heinous than – say – the murders Truman Capote wrote about in In Cold Blood or this appalling case from good old non-dhimmi steadfast ally in the War On Terror, the UK?
Crime porn is very dull and normally a way of avoiding debate rather than contributing to it, so I would like to see some engagement with other points in the post, especially in the light of the news that Dominique de Villepin has agreed to meet with the leaders of the student protests.
Alex, that BBC story is just as awful. I felt sick reading it.
I wasn’t name calling when I said the Barbarians. The gang called themselves les Barbares. I translated it from French.
Also what is non-dhimmi? I have never heard that word in either Australian English or Caledonia French and I couldn’t find it on dictionary.com
Well as to the French protests: French people have a degree of freedom, political consciousness and balls that Brits have not had and will not have for centuries.
*initiates can-of-worms opening procedure..*
Dhimmi was the legally tolerated status of religious minorities in the Ottoman empire. It is now used by aggressive neoconservative types as a bash attack on people who do not consider themselves at war with Muslims. My point was that a lot of (almost exclusively) Americans seem to think this is somehow of a piece with France’s refusal to join the invasion of Iraq, but there is no shortage of really horrible interpersonal violence on all sides of the supposed “clash of civilisations”.
Neo-Con = Neo-Nazi
Down with Anglo-Saxon backwardness and ignorance. No inch for racism, anti-semitism or islamophobia.
Good thing we got all our bases covered when it comes to varieties of idiocy. Good lord.
Interesting post. What you seem to have suffered is the functional equivalent of what you get in the UK if you post anything about English nationalism – i.e. the varieties of idiocy demonstrated in the comments section and failure to engage with the substance of the post. The substantive question concerned citizenship and the practice of citizenship (better than citizenship as performance or performative act, in my view). I agree with you on the constitutive importance of citizenship practice, but of course the interesting thing, especially in relation to a question involving immigrants and minorities, concerns the scope of (legal) citizenship (i.e. nationality), and consequently who can vote in the elections for which registration is occurring. France is now one of a minority of states in the EU which has no voting in local elections for third country nationals. It’s often discussed in political discourse, but in practice never acted upon, even by the Socialists who have been most supportive. But if, as you seem to suggest implicitly, voter registrations in the Paris suburbs does mean voter registration by traditionally excluded French citizens of North African, etc. origin, then that could also see an interesting change in both national and local elections which may not be to the advantage of either M de Villepin or M Sarkozy.
“The problem is, I think, not just one of the absurd demonisation campaign that flourished to such a weird extent in the US immediately before the war with Iraq (is that the first example in history of war fever directed against a nation other than the enemy?), although no doubt some people believed it, but of a deep difference in what public life is seen to be like. Whether it’s internal, or performed.”
I don’t know how the ‘demonisation’ campaign that originated in the US has any bearing on the subject( or title rather) of your post, which is the polity of France, but you could easily turn that argument around to fit your subject. The demonisation of the US in France is far stranger, but in the historical sense, par for the course. An astounding number of Europeans, who should know better, believe in some sort of Israeli/US conspiracy to perpetrate 9/11 or blithely march around with BushHitler posters without realizing the absurdity of such a comparison.
As for you ‘dhimmi’ comment, I think your being a bit premature and dismissive. There is, without a doubt, a segment of the European Muslim community that wishes to subjugate Europe to Islamic historical norms. Whether that segement is large or small is debateable, but the consequences will take decades to play out. And it may be a absurd worry 20 years from now, or it could be that Europe’s culture is permanently changed for the worse. You don’t have to be a neo-con to be concerned about the situation when all the available evidence is gathered and examined. But you do have to be intellectually dishonest to dismiss it as bollocks, per Weman. There are many unknowns.
I think I want to disagree strenuously with more than just the comment about “stabbing” in this post. For example, in the Spanish case, the terrorists very much are listening to the demonstrations, and that is why there are counter-demonstrations and counter-counter-demonstrations. So I don’t understand your dismissive attitude toward the anti-Semitism protest. After all, it is very easy to dismiss protesters as whiny or pro-this or anti-that.
It seems to me that people are genuinely worried about France, and the ones most worried aren’t American neo-cons but French citizens themselves. Otherwise the car-burning and rioting wouldn’t have turned into a crisis, and one torture killing wouldn’t have brought people into the streets. The fact that huge numbers of people now are protesting against (all things considered) is a fairly mild change in labor law is evidence that it is foremost French people who are worried about France.
The interesting thing is that mass protests are accepted as part of French political discourse, much more so than other countries. So in France at least, political theater and demonstrations seem to be a strong part of the ideal of citizenship, as opposed to, say, the English model.
Regarding everything that is happening in France at the moment, I am quite worried. Not because people are protesting (that is quite normal in France) but because people seem to be so afraid of the future. What kind of society have we created that 24 year olds fear about their pensions?
I am not sure if CPE is the answer but I am convinced that things must change. There are just too many things the average person worry about these days – jobs, Muslims, EU, (even our football team could be better!)
I don’t care if we go Left, Right, Far Right, but we can’t keep trying to maintain the status quo as if everything in France can be eternal and unmoved by the winds of time.
So in France at least, political theater and demonstrations seem to be a strong part of the ideal of citizenship, as opposed to, say, the English model.
Take the response of those who feel that the electoral system has failed them. In France in 2002 people queued up to vote against Le Pen, then publicly cleansed themselves in disinfectant stations provided for the purpose by left-wing activists (and by others too). Pure theatre, particularly since the result of the final round was never in doubt.
By contrast, in Britain in 2005, people registered their dissatisfaction by staying at home, choosing to vote – untheatrically – for Pop Idol or Big Brother instead. Blair’s absolute majority in Parliament comes from 36% of the vote on a 60% turnout.
Viewed in this light, the anti-semitism demos seem rather less phoney. I’m often quick to jump on the flaws and failings of French politics. But Hektor has a point.
The fact that huge numbers of people now are protesting against (all things considered) is a fairly mild change in labor law is evidence that it is foremost French people who are worried about France.
The interesting thing is that mass protests are accepted as part of French political discourse, much more so than other countries..
By contrast, in Britain in 2005, people registered their dissatisfaction by staying at home, choosing to vote – untheatrically – for Pop Idol or Big Brother instead. Blair’s absolute majority in Parliament comes from 36% of the vote on a 60% turnout.
That’s rather my point.
“It seems to me that people are genuinely worried about France”
I believe you are entirely right, Hektor Bim. Yesterday I spoke to someone who used to work for the administration and this person also noted the current anxiety, especially among young people. I can imagine why those young people cling to the job securities obtained in the past.
What is beginning to dawn on several people here in France is that is not just those who already are employed that need a certain amount of protection, but also, and maybe foremost, those that haven’t entered the labour market yet.
I remember that, when I graduated in 1991, a solid degree was no longer a guarantee to find work. This was in Belgium. When we were getting counselling on job prospects in secondary school we were told that the best bet was to go for studies you liked and not for something that was most likely to get you a job. That certainty was no longer there, and we are talking late 80s here.
So, there has been a history of growing insecurity creeping up on us. Add to that the whole 9-11 aftermath, the expansion of the EU with a number of countries where unemployment is very high (Polish plumber), the growing competition from Eastern countries, the sluggish economy, etcetera… It is not difficult to imagine people getting more and more anxious.
That’s rather my point.
One of them, sure. And a good one.
You also made a secondary point about the antisemitism demos, and came close to dismissing them as top-down and inauthentic.
My reading is rather different.
I think some evidence is required for the proposition that the UK electorate registered their dissatisfaction in 2005 by a low general election turnout, when the turnout was marginally up on the previous general election in 2001 (before September 11th, the military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, Gordon Brown’s 1% point increase in National Insurance to fund increased NHS spending, the worst of the stock market falls triggering worries about pensions etc).
Alan, you’re taking as your point of comparison an election where a punchdrunk opposition led by a figure of fun tried to persuade onlookers that they were a serious alternative, and failed. In 2001 turnout was the lowest since WW2, by some distance. By contrast, between 1945 and the millennium turnout had never fallen below 70%.
If you want more evidence, the ESRC’s got some.
But I see I responded above just to the idea that turnout in 2005 was not unusually low. You were also pointing out that the changing patterns of turnout can’t be explained by disenchantment with a particular government. I think you’re right. It’s something else.
The British are finding it harder to believe that political engagement – electoral or otherwise – will affect their lives for the better. Although the French are currently deep in depression, they manage not to display the same damaging cynicism about participation.
Bert,
Thanks for the pointer to ESRC findings. Your second response caught the intent of my comment more accurately thanks. My point was that in 2001 Blairites claimed the low turnout to be a sign of satisfaction with the status quo, but mostly lacked the chutzpah to make the same claim of a near-identical turnout in the vastly different political conditions of 2005.
I think that an implicit assumption of relative homogeneity of the portion of the electorate that is less interested in politics forms a common weakness in commentary on this issue. Prior to the advent of New Labour, apolitical bourgeois Britain was more strongly motivated to vote (eg John Major’s Conservatives securing 14000000+ votes in 1992), while apolitical proletarian Britain was strongly motivated to vote upto and including 1997 in the hope of a traditional Labour government.
Such a pattern of a large fall in natural turnout taking place over the course of exactly two parliaments centred on New Labour taking power is obviously not the whole story, but I think it needs to be accounted for in order to characterise cross partisan alienation.
How much depends turnout on the difference between safe and contested seats?
It strikes me that we should look a bit more closely at what we’re saying when we say that mass participation is on the decline in Britain. Alongside the high electoral turnouts of the relatively recent past, three years ago Britain’s largest ever peacetime demonstration brought the centre of London to a halt.
But what’s interesting about that is what followed. The government ignored the demonstrators. Then the electorate passed up the opportunity to punish the government at the ballot box.
You’ll probably disagree, Alan, but I think the explanation for this points us to a link between 2001 and 2005: in both elections turnout suffered because there was no credible alternative government. Sentiment about New Labour may well have shifted from complacent wait-and-see to sullen disillusionment between 2001 and 2005, but in neither case was change on the cards. Iain Duncan Smith had been housetrained by Rumsfeld during his time at shadow defence (arguably the highpoint of his entire political career was being invited to the Pentagon by the incoming Bush administration ahead of the serving UK Defence Secretary); as leader he saddled the Tories with an unpopular record on Iraq. An attempt at “dog whistle” techniques actually lost ground over the course of the campaign itself, reminding people why they disliked the party. An Independent article from the 2005 campaign captures unnamed officials trying to spin against this perception (“… it is far from a foregone conclusion that Labour will win. The country could be sleepwalking to a Tory government”) while Alan Milburn, a Blair creature, tells activists “The campaign is about making this a high turn-out election”. The strategy failed because it broke a basic marketing rule: if you make a claim it needs to be believable.
So, two tentative conclusions. Firstly, people are engaged by particular issues, but it’s hard to transfer any enthusiasm out there into national election campaigns when there’s no functioning government-in-waiting. And secondly, there might be some grounds to expect higher turnout if the outcome seems closer next time round. But on that last point I can think of at least one reason for caution. The Tories are currently engaged on a strategy closely modelled on Blair’s rise a decade ago. Media-savvy centrism, rigorously focus-group tested and determinedly non-ideological. There’s a danger that people will feel they’re being asked to choose between Coke and Pepsi, and will stay at home again.
Charly, obviously the point about close races boosting turnout works for individual seats in a similar way as at the national level. And parties have become very professional in the way they target campaigning resources at “key marginals”. Presumably this additional campaigning boosts turnout further, by reinforcing Get Out The Vote efforts if nothing else.
Can recent falls in turnout be explained by there being fewer marginal seats, however? I don’t think so.
If you’re interested in the subject, you might want to look at this (pdf). A different reading on 2005 from mine, and no specific answer to your question either, but well worth a read in any case.
Bert,
I think that the historical correlation between the closeness of the result and turnout is (just about) good enough to support an assertion that lack of a credible alternative government was, at least, a significant reason for consistent low turnout in 2001/2005. On the other hand, the average turnout over those two elections was 12 percentage points lower than over the two elections of 1983/1987. This appears to me to mean that we must either posit a marked secular decline in natural turnout, or regard the electorates of 1983/1987 as having been offered a credible alternative government in the form of a Labour/Alliance coalition, or, as I suggested above, look to inhomogeneity of the electorate.
It is quite possible that I have overlooked another alternative, and I am not dogmatic about the exact details. It is possible that traditionally Labour voters were more strongly motivated to vote in 1983 through fear that their party could go extinct, than were Conservatives in 2001/2005, but that is from the same general class of explanations.
Yes good point about the eighties.
And my suggestion about Coke and Pepsi doesn’t help that much either: in 1983 the parties were ideologically distinctive, but if you go back to previous periods of consensus – Butskellism for instance – turnout was high.
We might swallow hard and reach for a sociological explanation, one that would also cover the steep falls in the levels of party membership, Church of England congregations, etc. Globalisation, creative destruction of liberalised markets, social dislocation – that kind of thing. I’m sure one could build a case of sorts that would explain low turnout in those terms. But in the end, two elections is kind of a small sample to base solid conclusions on.
Perhaps all we can say is that the electorate does seem to have a fairly homogonous view of politicians. Unpopular and mistrusted.
I wrote homogonous.
I meant of course humungous.