So Just When Does Spain’s Twin Deficit Problem Become Unsustainable?

This, it seems, is the question of the day. According to the IMF Spain’s economy faces a contraction of at least one percent next year. And the IMF stress that the risks to this forecast “remain on the downside” since the country’s real-estate market is “in full correction,”. Also, horror of horrors (and we will return to this). The government’s budget deficit will exceed five percent of gross domestic product next year, the Fund forecast.

While the IMF seem to be more aware of the scale of the problem than the Spanish government currently are, they do seem to be putting all of the emphasis for recovery on some much needed labour market reforms, but personally I don’t think even these are playing in the right ball park, we need a big picture “breakout” escape plan, to cut loose from the pincers of cash drought, corporate bankruptcy, construction dependency, large scale contraction and price deflation. It’s a big mess, and will need an equally bold and ambitious plan to get to grips with it.

One point which is obvious at this stage is the Spanish government forecasting – where they have built a 1% expansion into the 2009 budget – is getting ever more out of line with the economic dynamic. Really this is the first thing which has to change. Spain urgently needs someone leading the country who is able to turn the page, put some realistic numbers on the table, and try to work to meet objectives, instead of simply failing to achieve them time after time. What do I mean by this, well, if you seriously think that the contraction next year will be of 2% of GDP then it is better to say 3%, and beat your target, that say 1% growth and come in with a 2% contraction. Not only will your citizens be getting more and more fed up with all of this (and the impact on morale should not be treated lightly) but much more to the point, since Spain is heavily dependent on foreign finance to buy the debt that the government is going to need to issue (see more below) to finance the fiscal deficit, then each and every failure to achieve target is likely to be punished with a higher cost of financing debt (as the yield spread on the risk rises). So as well as the credibility cost, this kind of playing fast and loose with the forecast is now likely to carry a real financial cost. Continue reading

Steinbruck twisting in the wind…

German finance minister Peer Steinbrück has made some enemies lately, giving an interview in which he accused the UK of “crass Keynesianism” and complained that it had spent so many years lecturing the rest of the EU about fiscal rectitude. The last bit’s pretty cheeky from a German finance minister, after all those years of Hans Eichel and the Bundesbank directors wagging their fingers at those irresponsible southerners, but let’s let it pass. Steinbrück got called into the British embassy, but very soon he had more serious problems.

Let’s stop and think about this for a moment; what were his motivations? The first thing to remember is that an EU member state spends on average about 20% of GDP on imports from other members. The second is that industrial exports make up a really big chunk of the German economy. So if you’re Germany, and you don’t think the recession will be quite that bad, there’s an argument for sitting tight and enjoying about 20% of everyone else’s fiscal stimulus. Obviously the net leakage will vary depending on the exact details; a consumer-side stimulus like the UK one will probably leak more, a public works one like the French rather less, in so far as it’s labour-intensive and therefore nontradable. If, however, it involves buying a lot of Repower wind turbines, QCells solar panels, or Siemens trains and control electronics, well, perhaps not so much.

And arguably the UK consumer sector is less likely to import from Germany than it is from the world dollar zone, specifically China. The main exception is cars, but new car purchases are almost all on credit, and the sector is currently credit-rationed. So perhaps he was talking his own book? Surely, however, in this case he wouldn’t have attacked the stimulus in general. Another possibility is that he’s thinking of German politics. The more the rest of Europe stimulates, the more pressure on Steinbrück to do likewise – from the coalition partners, from the French, and from the SPD membership. After all, down at the provincial level, there have been rumblings for weeks about the NRW state government buying into the Opel plants if GM goes bust; the car industry is hugely important and it’s in deep trouble.

The French. Well, as Le Monde reports, Germany is being placed under intense diplomatic pressure by France and the UK. It’s a little-remarked on aspect of the crisis that Anglo-French relations have become very good, a continuation of a Blair government trend. Politically, it’s much more acceptable for a German government minister to have a public row with the British – but as the Le Monde article makes clear, there is considerable tension between France and Germany. So much so that Merkel publicly reiterated a commitment to Europeanness in a recent press conference.

So why is he clinging to the point? Probably because he wants to go into an election with a balanced or close to balanced budget as an accomplishment he can stick a big red SPD flag in, and not incidentally, write his name on. This implies he’s thinking of fighting the election across the centre ground, trying to score off the CDU and FDP, rather than trying to regain ground from the Left. But is this at all realistic? In an interview with Der Spiegel, none other than Paul Krugman declared that both Steinbrück and Angela Merkel have underestimated the seriousness of the situation. Der Spiegel also claims that the government is expecting a deficit of 3% of GDP. Elsewhere, on his own weblog, Krugman deployed the ultimate economic rhetorical weapon – The Economic Consequences of Herr Steinbrück, no less. Meanwhile, the chief economist of the OECD chipped in as well.

The upshot? What have we here? A €30bn German fiscal shot is apparently being prepared; note that the work is going on between Merkel’s office, the (conservative) Minister of the Economy, and the coalition partners, cutting Steinbrück and the Finance Ministry out of the process. Of course, he retains the power of the purse, but then, Merkel retains the Richtlinienkompetenz and could stick a directive down his shirt front. (Which appears to be what Nicolas Sarkozy is expecting.) Or he could be sacked. Either course would leave the SPD faced with a choice between its cabinet-level leaders and its membership; fighting for Steinbrück’s authority could involve fighting an election on a promise of fiscal restriction, just as millions of IG-Metall members are terrified of losing their jobs.

After all, down in the microeconomy, BMW is about to offer emergency funding to its suppliers and dealerships in an effort to prevent a wave of bankruptcies. ZF, the gearbox maker, is worried both about its unpaid bills from the car makers and also about the availability of credit to its subcontractors. Today’s meeting at the Kanzleramt looks like it’s going to be tasty, to say the least.

Irish people to be made an offer they can’t refuse

It’s not surprising, but no less brazen for that: the Irish government will apparently propose later today at the EU Summit in Brussels that the rejected Lisbon Treaty be put again to referendum no later than October of next year.  So says the Irish Times which has seen the draft summit agreement.  The package will essentially be unchanged from what was voted on before, but the 26 others will have to agree to keep the Commission at a size allowing at least one commissioner from each country.  Declarations regarding Ireland’s neutrality and tax autonomy will apparently also be added, but the Irish government will be in the slightly strange position of arguing that these declarations are significant when it previously argued that the associated concerns were meaningless.  It’s a packed agenda at Brussels, also including the need to patch up obvious disagreement between France and the UK on the one hand and Germany on the other on the size of fiscal stimulus.  One suspects that some of the countries are annoyed that the Irish question is still hanging around.

UPDATE [1925 GMT]: Gordon Brown apparently believes that if the new guarantees given to Ireland have any legal content, the UK would have to reratify the treaty.

Is Greece having a 1968?

Young people in the streets.  The government forced into an early election and saying that it can’t control the country.  Years of simmering discontent apparently coalescing into serious civil unrest.   Perhaps things look worse than they are because of the police tactic of avoiding direct confrontations with rioters where possible: sacrifice property to safe life.  But is there any other European country this close to boiling point?

Power and

Last week, some US-based bloggers were talking about their dissatisfaction with the term, “soft power.”

Matthew Yglesias:

[C]an we retire the term “soft power” already? I always feel that it’s been popularized not so much by Professor Nye as by deranged warmongers who like the idea of terming every alternative to militarism as somehow “soft,” fluffy, and weak. Soft Power is a good book, but it’s a bad coinage for an era in which national security issues have returned as a partisan political topic, and I don’t think it’s an especially great label for what Nye’s talking about.

Here’s a suggestion cribbed from an adaptation of an old tabletop game: power and influence. Roughly speaking, power is the ability to make people do things (or suffer the consequences); influence is the ability to get people to do things on their own (to gain the benefits). NATO has lots of power (and a good bit of influence), while the EU has an enormous amount of influence, but less power. Pointy-haired bosses use their power; good businesspeople use their influence.

Influence is not a second-rate type of power (soft rather than hard); it’s a separate, if related, capacity. So: power and influence.

I wrote to some of the folks whose blogs I cited. Everyone who has replied has been positive about the suggestion. Now to see if they will actually use it, and whether we can change the usage ourselves or whether we need Joe Nye to write an article.

A Fistful of Diamonds

More like a bag, or indeed several.

Armed robbers pulled off one of the world’s biggest jewellery heists at a famed Paris store, making off with 85 million euros (107 million dollars) in diamonds and valuables, officials said Friday.

A gang of four thieves — two of them disguised as women — on Thursday stole nearly all the jewels on display at the Harry Winston boutique just off the Champs-Elysees avenue, which attracts a wealthy international clientele. …

Or maybe it’s an economic stimulus package?

The Lisbon wildcard

As pressure mounts on Irish PM Brian Cowen to announce the seemingly inevitable 2nd referendum to ratify the EU Treaty of Lisbon, the Czech ratification is still not resolved and looks set to shake up Czech politics no matter what happens.   ODS (Civic Democratic Party) is having their congress this weekend, which includes a leadership election pitting PM Mirek Topolanek as heavy favourite to be reelected despite poor regional election results. His opponent is Prague Mayor Pavel Bem — a Eurosceptic.  And Czech President Vaclav Klaus, the Eurosceptic-in-chief, has resigned his honourary chairmanship of ODS.  Thus the seeds of a split are being sown.  This follows what apparently was a circus of a meeting between Klaus and a group of MEPs yesterday, in which Klaus’s de facto alliance with Irish anti-Lisbon group Libertas was a major issue.

Continue reading

Too flexible

The global financial crisis has had a continual capacity to surprise policymakers and the latest unpleasantness would appear to be the failure of the IMF-backed stabilization program in Ukraine barely a month after it was announced.  As we noted at the time, the program emphasized a flexible exchange rate, to avoid blowing reserves on a futile defence of a peg (something on which the Fund’s reputation took a hammering during past crises in Russia and Argentina).  But the effect seems to have been a worst of both worlds situation where the failure to establish a credible range for the hryvnia led to a severe loss of confidence in it, with the result that the IMF loan is essentially covering a dollarization of the economy.  Ukraine had the bad luck to have a dollar benchmark for the exchange rate just as the dollar was sharply appreciating.  If they had been coming into the stabilization plan with a history of pegging against the euro (or sterling!) things wouldn’t look so bad.  One lesson would appear to be that planting an economic stabilization plan into unresolved political instability doesn’t work so well.  The Fund may look at Romania with a more jaundiced eye as a result.