About Alex Harrowell

Alex Harrowell is a research analyst for a really large consulting firm on AI and semiconductors. His age is immaterial, especially as he can't be bothered to update this bio regularly. He's from Yorkshire, now an economic migrant in London. His specialist subjects are military history, Germany, the telecommunications industry, and networks of all kinds. He would like to point out that it's nothing personal. Writes the Yorkshire Ranter.

Frelections: divers

Rundown of the statements. Hollande, perhaps taking the accusation of being dull to heart: “Plusieurs faits majeurs sortent de ce scrutin. Le premier est que je suis en tête du premier tour.” Le Pen says the vote lets her supporters join the table of the elite, an odd statement from someone who certainly won’t be in round two. Mélénchon reminds everyone to be anti-Sarkozy, i.e. passing his support to Hollande without saying so. Bayrou’s saying nothing much until he’s met the two leading candidates. Sarko wants extra TV debates, gambling on survival.

Results are being revised down a tad, with the gap between the leaders a little less. For what it’s worth, IPSOS’s exit poll crossbreak for working-class voters is as follows: Le Pen 30 %, Hollande 27 %, Sarkozy 18 %, Mélenchon 12 %, Bayrou 8 %. IPSOS also reckons the 2nd round will go 54-46 Hollande.

Here’s an interview with some FN activists, quite a few of whom won’t behave as expected in round two. Some estimates put the percentage of reverse switchers (FN->PS) at up to 27%.

And here’s a table summarising the polling data. Everyone seems to have over-estimated Mélénchon and Bayrou and under-estimated Le Pen, but the estimate on Hollande seems to be improving a bit as the results tighten up.

Frelections: Polling blowout

The first estimated results are in. 28.4% Hollande, 25.5% Sarkozy, 20% Le Pen, 11.7% Mélénchon, 8.7% Bayrou.

The final polls for Sarko were pretty much right, in the context of a margin of error of 1% either way. That makes him the only sitting president to lose the first round, ever. Hollande beat the spread by half a percentage point beyond the margin of error – which makes him the best scorer ever for the Left in a first round, and makes the polls look poor. The margin or error for the second-tier candidates is wider, more like 2 points either way. But with Le Pen coming in 4 percentage points over the last polls, 2 points out of the spread, and Mélénchon almost as far below the polls, it’s been a bad night for the pollsters. In fact, Le Pen beat her father’s record from 2002, and nobody predicted that.

French radio has already made the interesting point that Sarkozy had pursued a strategy of turning to the hard right in the final stages of the campaign, with a view to moving to the centre for the second round. This is a classic recipe for winning the two-round election, but it hasn’t been missed that it was Sarko’s adviser Patrick Buisson who suggested it, and he’s the former editor of the extreme right’s favourite magazine, Minute, one of many old extreme-rightists on Sarkozy’s staff. The problem is that he still needs to get the centre on board, but with 20% of the electorate to his right, he needs to cover that flank as well, which may well be impossible.

So, the Socialists and the FN won; Mélénchon, Sarkozy, and the pollsters lost.

Looking like the president

A longstanding attack line on Hollande was that he was a sort of vague fat guy. This was silly, in part – his biggest job in politics was running the PS organising machine, and that’s not the sort of thing you do if you’re flaky on details or unwilling to put in the hours. This NYT profile isn’t much cop but does contain something interesting.

He described how no one thought François Mitterrand, France’s first and only Socialist president, had a chance of winning. “Often people told me, ‘Oh, la, la, François Mitterrand, what charisma, what a president!’ But before he became president, they used to call him badly dressed, old, archaic, he knows nothing about the economy.” But the day he was elected, Hollande said, Mitterrand was transformed.

This is true. Back at the end of December, I took issue with the whole notion of being “presidential” on my own blog. I found that the last two occasions there was a change of prime minister in the UK both saw a strongly statistically significant uplift in polling data for the guy who got the job. In 2005, when Tony Blair remained prime minister, there was no such change.

If you want to look like the president, become the president. The qualities we think of as being those of the president are an artefact of the halo effect; we know he or she has them, because we associate them with the office.

Frelections: Mélénchon

Mélénchon. What’s that about? My answer is, basically, “performing Frenchness”, but we’ll come to that. Le Monde has a really good article on the degree to which the Front de Gauche and the Socialists are in violent agreement. Some of Mélénchon’s key social policy proposals, after all, appeared in Ségoléne Royal’s manifesto back in 2007, and they called her a weak-sauce Blairite. The PS is keen to play up the convergence, partly in order to compete for votes with the FDG and partly to signal that co-operation in government is a possibility. (In 1981 and again in 1997, the PS operated in coalition with the Communists, so there is a historical precedent for the extreme Left to be in government.)

The man himself vigorously denies that he’s trying to influence the broader Left. But he would say that. In getting concessions out of the PS, he needs to play hard to get. Further, in trying to drag the Overton window leftwards, it makes sense to increase the perception of extremism around his policies. But on quite a few issues, there is a sort of synergy emerging. Hollande wants to renegotiate the new stability pact, Mélénchon wants to put it to a referendum. The high probability that it would be rejected by a referendum would strengthen the French hand in renegotiating.

On the other hand, they disagree strongly about budget policy, and the price for joining a coalition currently includes signing up to support the PS’s budget.

Here’s a discussion of Mélénchon in the context of French leftwing history. This is rather what I mean by performing Frenchness. French political speech is marked by the politics of the orator – rather than a big tent, one rallies the people, implicitly at some vast mass gathering at the cross-roads of history. That’ll be history with a capital H, of course. (The horse is optional.) And so you get grey centre-right IT-director figures like François Fillon speaking texts that read like nothing but blood and thunder.

Mélénchon’s campaign has been all about oratory and mass meetings, the public theatre of the republic, implicitly opposed to the dubious politics of parliaments and bureaucracies. The big question about it is whether the emergence of a (reasonably) united left-of-the-left movement will tend to split the Left’s vote, or whether it will tend to mobilise it and legitimise more radical ideas. See also, the notion of resistance.

This ambiguity ran through 20th century French politics. Sometimes the Socialists and Communists reinforced each other, as in the Popular Front and the 1981 campaign. Sometimes, as in 1978 and 2002, they fought the real war against each other and the Right profited by their disunity. Of course, Mélénchon’s movement isn’t emerging, it’s re-emerging – the point is well made that it consists of the surviving Communist Party organisation plus the newer ones set up by successive stars of the far Left.

Mélénchon’s own discourse does tell us something about what he plans to do with the crowds he rallies in the public squares, the visible synthesis of the Republic and the Left. He regularly compares Hollande to George Papandreou, and refers to the concept of the Zapatero trap. This idea, which originates in the PS, basically says that to succeed, a left-wing government in France must take the European Union with it, rather than being stuck in an EU dominated by the neoliberalism of the 90s. My take here is that he wants to hold Hollande’s feet to the fire, and also to haul the European Overton window towards the sunshine.

Frelections: a tour of the manifestos

A few days ago, this half-French household got its official mailshot with the full set of candidates’ manifestos, from Sarkozy through to Jean-Pierre Cheminade, plus the kit of polling cards. You might be surprised by the consensus across them. Basically, the political nation has spoken, and what it said was “Piss off, bankers.” Now, the manner in which this sentiment was expressed varied a lot, and the concrete policy proposals to give it effect even more.

Two of the extreme-left candidates who didn’t join Mélénchon’s united front wish to default immediately on the national debt, for example, and they also want to seize the entire banking system by force majeure.

Mélénchon wants to amend the European treaties to explicitly permit central bank financing of the government, and is in general very keen on an inflationary exit from the crisis (is he perhaps a bit of a Modern Monetary Theorist?). He’s also quite keen on narrow banking, as are the extremists. But so are the Greens. And the Front National.

Hollande is strategically vague (as is Sarkozy), but does want to re-open the ECB charter, to regulate the banks more stringently, and to reorganise the various state-owned financial institutions into a national “pole”. The idea of a big public-sector bank is one that basically everybody seems to more or less support, in more or less centralised forms. Mélénchon of course wants a great national institution, presumably with a vast headquarters building somewhere in Paris, either suitably chic on the right bank or else in glass and steel out on the périf. The Greens see it as a network of local mutuals.

Similarly, a flavour of high Keynesianism prevails throughout. Everyone expect Sarko wants a big public works programme, and even he nods in the direction of stimulus. The exact content varies, of course. This threatens to run counter to EU doctrine, and pretty much everyone would like to redesign European institutions, although this is always framed as a demand for more European integration even when (like Mélénchon) it involves getting rid not just of the free movement of capital but even of goods within the EU. He’s actually more protectionist than the FN.

Being anti-nuclear power has been fashionable lately in France, and the manifestos are surprisingly far down that track. Obviously the Greens hate it, but hardly anyone wants to defend it. Hollande, for example, promises to reduce the share of nuclear in the energy mix over time, which seems to mean keeping the nukes and building wind turbines. But that’s as far as anyone will go defending it, with the exception of Cheminade. That one’s a bit of a phenomenon – his manifesto is basically the sort of thing you get on science-fiction blogs on a slow day, all about the vital necessity of developing the world with nuclear power, putting more effort into fusion research, and colonising space. And setting up a new national public sector bank, of course.

On the other hand, even the Greens only offer to suspend work on the development of future nuclear weapons, keeping the existing ones. Everyone seems to be in agreement on keeping the Bomb. Mélénchon wants to decommission the air-launched component and rely (like the UK) exclusively on the submarines, but that’s it. Despite that, the rest of the Green manifesto is very much an 80s classic – apparently all cancers have environmental causes concealed by the pharma lobby, and it’s an urgent priority to serve organic food in all school meals.

And the incumbent? Not much to say, really, except for appeals to authority in these difficult times, and micro-initiatives. But then, that’s the story of Sarkozy’s presidency – it might have worked had he not just managed to be elected in time for Depression 2.0, and the big question since late 2007 has been whether the Socialists would manage to pick a candidate this time out. That story was more exciting than we expected. And it is now at an end.

Frelections

It’s French election day. The final poll (all survey fieldwork must stop by law several days before the polls open) is here, putting Hollande and Sarkozy level around 27% (+/-1), Marine Le Pen on 16%, Jean-Luc Mélénchon on 14%, and the rest tailing in well behind. Every poll for the last 12 months has Hollande winning by a landslide in the second round.

Le Monde‘s polling blog adds up the Left and Right camps here, and notes that the parties of the Left tot up to 46% of the vote in the first round, compared with 43.5% for the Right. This is a historically high score for the Left, as high as the wave that elected Francois Mitterand in 1981 although not quite as big as his re-election in 1988.

As far as the second round electoral maths goes, though, even if France invented the notion of a canonical left-right divide, it’s more complicated than that. Francois Bayrou represents a separate, independent rightist tradition to Nicolas Sarkozy, and the Front National support isn’t monolithic – a substantial percentage of FN voters are expected to switch to the Socialist candidate in the second round. If that survey is good, Hollande can expect to gain more Bayrou voters than Sarkozy, plus 83% of Mélénchon’s, and a substantial minority of the FN. There’s an assessment of polling accuracy here. Conclusion: pretty good, and improving.

Also, it’s worth noting that the shock of 2002 had as much to do with a bad day for the PS as it did with a good one for the FN. Marine Le Pen is on 16% in the final polls, 11 points behind the leaders, so it would take a polling catastrophe of astonishing proportions for her to make the cut. As a result, one of the biggest questions that will be answered tonight is which extremist takes third place. On a couple of occasions during the last month of the campaign, Mélénchon pulled ahead of Le Pen in the polls, and they are competing within the statistical margin of error, which is itself bigger for the down-ticket candidates.

A Mélénchon win (or rather first-loser) would force quite a lot of assumptions about European politics to be revised, and would probably bring about an epic bout of internal feuding in the FN. What influence he would have would depend very much on how well his ability to bring out the Left for a mass meeting translates into parliamentary seats in the elections which follow in a month’s time.

Slight return to the politics of wage bargaining

A little late-night raking over the embers of my jihad against Nick Rowe. RPPE discusses an interesting point of Robert Solow’s – notably that the idea of a vertical long-run Phillips curve and accelerating inflation above the NAIRU is, or was, conventional wisdom, but nobody ever believed that you could push it the other way and get accelerating deflation. Believing in monetarism implied both disbelieving in sticky prices and also believing in them at the same time.

Anyway, from there we get to the question of exactly what “wage bargainers”‘ expectations might be and how they got set in the 1980s.

The big question that comes out of all of this is if when we are talking about labour markets and inflation if we are not better to put our arguments essentially in the terms of political economy such as institutions and bargaining power or in narrow technical terms? Can you even talk about expectations without talking about institutions and power?

Go, read. See also Bloomberg on a little German sunshine and Business Monitor predicting strikes in May. Some people think that’s a bad thing, of course.

Review: in which modern science finally explains the economics profession

Daniel Kahneman, the cognitive psychologist who with Amos Tversky won the Nobel Prize for Economics, has a major book out. Thinking, Fast and Slow is basically an effort at a popular synthesis of the state of research into human cognition and specifically into the heuristics-and-biases approach he and Tversky founded. It’s also a memoir of Tversky, a look over the debates between the cognitive psychologists and the economists, between the heuristics-and-biases school and their rivals (who Kahneman thinks have a point), and an attempt to operationalise some of this stuff.

This could easily have been a book that would have been worth mocking. A worse writer could have made it an annoying exercise in Enlightenment fetishism, an airport brick about how you too can get smarter by being more like Homo economicus through these three simple techniques everyone should know. I should know – I bought it in an airport, on a business trip, and read it on a plane. Fortunately, though, rather than one of Robin Hanson’s pals at a Koch Industries economics department near you, it’s by a proper scientist in a hard science, where being wrong is something that actually matters.

Wrongness is a major theme in the book, although not necessarily in the way you’d expect. Kahneman and Tversky’s research was based on the notion that people are wrong in regular and predictable ways, and studying these predictable errors of reasoning would cast light on the nature of intelligence, as well as perhaps helping to avoid them. These are the famous cognitive biases they listed in the classic article Judgment under Uncertainty, which is reprinted as an appendix to the book (it would be worth the price of the book in itself). On the other hand, the naturalistic decision-making school around Gary Klein argued that although people may well be reliably wrong in some ways, they make many more right decisions than wrong ones, and it ought to be worth knowing how. (This reminded me of Johan Galtung’s crack that plenty of people study the causes of war, but perhaps they ought to look at the causes of peace.)

The two schools of thought developed a hearty loathing, distinctive tone and style, and distinctive methodologies – Kahneman, whose training in psychology was in the highly experimentalist and numerical field of human performance and perception, tended to rely on carefully designed experiments with endless students staring into high-speed cameras while doing mental arithmetic against the clock, while Klein and his colleagues were keen on anthropological fieldwork, shadowing fire chiefs around New York City in an effort to document how experts made intuitive judgments of complex problems.

Thinking, Fast and Slow is a shot at synthesis between the two. Kahneman argues that although we are dogged by the reliable biases of intuition, we also tend to undervalue the power of the quick, parallel, associative, social, physically embodied, and effortless computation going on in what he (quoting Canadian psychologists Keith Stanovic and Richard West) calls System One. System One, among other things, is the home of genuine expertise – the coup d’oeil Klein’s firemen had gained through long practice and nasty surprises. It also knows how to empathise with others, operate the human body and every tool we use to extend it, and monitor our environments for the unusual with uncanny attention.

Unfortunately, it’s also systematically dreadful with numbers, in subtle and annoying ways (statistics in general stump it, but it likes to work with averages, its assessments of probability overweight both rare and certain outcomes, while also ignoring quite big differences in likelihood in the middle of the range), it hoovers up every scrap of information it can regardless of source or plausibility and works it into its judgments, and the cornucopia of processing power its massive parallelism provides means that it will work out all the possible answers with the information it has, for good or ill. It’s a sucker for a good story, and it has a tendency to answer the questions it can rather than the ones it’s asked.

System Two is the unified, serial, individual, disembodied, algorithmic mind we call “I”. It can do sums and apply general intelligence to new problems, and it can intervene in the activity of System One. However, it’s not much for the physical world, and its resources are strictly limited. Using it rapidly burns up actual physical fuel, running down the stock of glucose in the blood – as we tire, we rely more on System One, and we make more mistakes. Judges are more likely to grant prisoners parole if they’ve just had their breakfast. (If you want an airport factoid, Kahneman says eat a good breakfast.) Of course, if he’s right, this says some worrying things about the quality of the original judgments.

Thinking, Fast and Slow also says a lot of worrying things about the quality of economics, going right back to the 1950s. Kahneman provides a fantastic anecdote about how Paul Samuelson and Kenneth Arrow (among an impressive list of economists) were fooled by the Allais paradox, an experiment which reliably makes a large majority of people behave not just irrationally in terms of expected value, but inconsistently – they or rather we act in one question as if we were picking the biggest potential pay-off, but in the second as if we were opting for certainty above all. Its inventor, Maurice Allais, apparently expected the demonstration to collapse the whole project of rational choice economics, but the economists simply confessed their bafflement and proceeded to completely ignore the whole issue.

Kahneman is also pleasantly tough on some of his own ideas. In the 1950s, he was assigned by the Israeli army to devise psychometric assessments to choose potential leaders from the annual classes of conscripts. The ones they were already using, based on a structured interview with psychodynamic principles, had turned out to be completely unpredictive of future performance. He invented a system based on a list of factual questions designed to score the recruit against a number of qualities. The interviewers were outraged, feeling themselves deskilled and insulted. As a sop, he included a new question which asked them to dismiss the recruit, shut their eyes, and give a purely subjective rating on a scale of 1 to 10.

The subjective score turned out to be as good as any of the factual questions in predicting their later performance, and in the final version, it was assigned an equal weighting with them. You don’t often meet a book about being more rational that is sceptical of classical rationality; this one is, and as such it is worth reading. Some readers will note an echo of the Freudian view of the mind in the two-systems concept, and I think they would be right. Psychoanalysis may be a shadow-influence on the whole book, in fact – Kahneman is clear that part of his purpose is to provide language, a form of words, to express these problems in conversation. Jacques Lacan argued that the unconscious has the structure of a language, and it is worth noting that it is System One that deals in words. However, I’m not convinced by the talking-points that close each chapter, probably where the book gets closest to its friends on the airport bookshelf.

It is probably worth mentioning, as a finish, the fascinating idea that there may be a difference between intelligence and rationality – that the two are independent vectors. Kahneman gets this from Stanovic and West, who theorise that as well as intelligence in the raw-smarts sense, there is a further independent quality of reason that denotes executive function, kinaesthetic skill, and meta-cognition, the awareness of one’s own thinking and its limits (the inverse of the famous Dunning-Kruger effect). If this is so, we might imagine four groups of people – those unfortunate enough to end up without much of either, who are stupid but so much so that they can’t do too much damage, the geniuses blessed with both, the great competent majority with more rationality than intelligence, and a fourth category, those people who are impressively intelligent but somehow manage to be terribly wrong when it matters and a real pain in the arse to boot.

These men are dangerous – they think too much, or perhaps they reason or feel or whatever the right word is too little. And their intelligence means that their errors can be unusually disastrous, especially as it can lead them into positions of power and responsibility. Further, they are easily mistaken for eccentric geniuses, just as snobbery and racism lead people to confuse groups three and one.

The best thing I can say about Thinking, Fast and Slow is that a Nobel Prizewinner in Economics has successfully explained Larry Summers.

Econolinks: EU trade, Spanish wages, Icelandic debt

Catching up after being off around Europe. Here’s a links post.

You may recall that the EU fiscal pact included at least some warm words about the idea of limiting excessive trade surpluses (as well as deficits) within the eurozone. This is progress, but of course the devil is in the detail. The European Commission’s demonologists were called in to work out the detail. Jean Quatremer reports:

Ainsi, la balance des comptes courants est censée être comprise entre – 4% et + 6% du PIB au cours des trois dernières années. Et, miracle, celle de l’Allemagne est de + 5,9 % !

I.e. the reference range is defined as a three-year moving average of the current account balance between -4% and +6% of GDP. Why is it not symmetrical around zero? Not that there’s a specific argument that it should be, but it’s telling…because Germany’s CA surplus is exactly +5.9% of GDP. Trebles all round.

For the first time on record, the share of Spanish GDP accounted for by profits exceeded that accounted for by wages.

Iceland’s cramdown of mortgages exceeding 110% LTV is considered beneficial, at least by Bloomberg and by Lars Christensen of Danske Bank.

Stimulus? It’ll all go to China. Or not

This new post at VoxEU on the sudden plunge in world trade in 2008-2009 is very interesting. For one thing, it gives us some detail about how the crisis was transmitted around the world, and how this transmission happened between typically supply-side factors (wages are too high, the wrong goods are produced, everyone is suddenly a “zero marginal product worker”) and demand-side ones. It seems that the unprecedently large chunk of world trade that consists of intermediate goods in supply chains played an important part. On this occasion, “The World, On Time” was the last thing anyone wanted.

Another interesting and important point which isn’t explicitly made is that fiscal stimulus didn’t actually “leak” as so many people feared. Countries that carried out substantial stimulus didn’t see their balance of payments get sharply worse. This is because public spending often goes into nontradable goods, and the rest is often spent on home production.

In so far as you want “rebalancing”, then, it doesn’t make sense to think that austerity leads to it.