About Doug Merrill

Freelance journalist based in Tbilisi, following stints in Atlanta, Budapest, Munich, Warsaw and Washington. Worked for a German think tank, discovered it was incompatible with repaying US student loans. Spent two years in financial markets. Bicycled from Vilnius to Tallinn. Climbed highest mountains in two Alpine countries (the easy ones, though). American center-left, with strong yellow dog tendencies. Arrived in the Caucasus two weeks before its latest war.

Unsteady in Armenia

Since the dubious election, supporters of Ter-Petrosian have been occupying the main square in downtown Yerevan, trying to spark some Orange or Rose action.

Saturday morning, riot police apparently failed in a pre-dawn attempt to break up the protest and send everyone home. The confrontation escalated, and Eurasia.net is reporting two dead with “running street battles that involved shots fired and Molotov cocktails tossed. Military armored personnel carriers were also seen taking up positions in the capital.” Reuters is reporting only one person killed, while Associated Press confirms injuries but no fatalities; Voice of America cites other new reports of one dead.

Sarkisian, outgoing Prime Minister incoming President, has declared a 20-day state of emergency. The OSCE, through its current chairman the Finnish Foreign Minister, condemned the use of force against peaceful demonstrators. Reactions from other capitals are about what one would expect on a Saturday afternoon or evening, when there are dozens of casualties in the Middle East, Russia confirms its next president tomorrow, and Armenia is not much on anybody’s radar.

Our own Doug and Claudia Muir are in Yerevan, though a good distance from the city center. Developing.

Hamburg and Hesse

In James Gleick’s bestseller, Chaos: Making a New Science, one of the recurring phrases is “period three implies chaos.” Grossly simplified, once things start oscillating among three stable states, chaos is inevitable and ubiquitous. In politics, particularly German politics, three parties did not imply chaos, but rather orderly transitions with the hinge party making a switch from time to time. The advent of a fourth, the Greens, didn’t cause structural problems either. But the fifth, now called the Left, is doing the chaotic trick nicely.
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Problems of Recognition

A developing story, of course, but the BBC is reporting that the US, UK, France, Germany and Italy recognizing or pledging to recognize the independence of Kosovo. Wikipedia is also quick off the mark with its entry on the now-official flag.

The EU has papered over its differences, with the common foreign and security policy consisting of saying that Kosovo “does not set a precedent,” and then leaving it to member states to decide their own relations with the territory. Spain is the biggest EU country withholding recognition; others in this group include Cyprus and Slovakia (worried about the Hungarian minority, one presumes, and given the approach of one of the parties in the governing coalition they may be right to, though a Köztásaság Kistranzdunaj (Republic of the Little Area Across the Danube) seems silly).

France has got to be a blow, considering it was the most pro-Serbian Western country during the conflict in 1999. If memory serves, some members of the French military were even charged with passing sensitive information to Serbia at about that time. French foreign minister Kouchner said that at some future date, both would be in the European Union together. I’m not sure that helps.

Consequences? Too early for me to say. It may indeed be a one-off, the last in the cascade of the former Yugoslavia.

Fistful of CDOs?

Spanish banks borrowed up to EUR 44 billion in December from the European Central Bank, “replacing banks’ use of wholesale capital markets, which have been strangled by the global credit crunch,” writes today’s FT. Furthermore, “The Spanish banking system is second only to the UK in Europe in its use of mortgage-backed bond makrets and other securitisations to fund lending.”

The European effects of the bursting of the US housing bubble have mostly been echoes, but maybe this is a sign that Europe has some bubbles of its own to worry about.

Taking Stock of 2007: Books

I read about as much in 2007 as I did in 2006, but I wrote far fewer reviews. One of the perils of full-time employment. It also looks like a year of consolidation, rather than a year of discovery. Having polished off the lucky thirteenth in Lemony Snicket’s set in December 2006, I reached the end of 20 books with Aubrey and Maturin in January 2007. While in the course of the year I only re-read four books, I went back to the well with a lot of authors I knew I liked. Even the Stalin biography was by the same author. And just one book in German the whole year. Schade.

Among what was new to me in fiction, Cory Doctorow and Paul Park made the biggest impression. Doctorow needs little introduction in the blog-world, but his fiction is strange and interesting, addictive and just a little unsettling. Park is fooling around with the tenets of fantasy in a way that I like, and as soon as part part three makes it into paperback, I’ll gobble up parts two and three. (If your budget runs to fantasy in hardback, don’t tell me how it ends!) The fun factor was highest in Naomi Novik’s four novels. Napoleonics with dragons, what’s not to like? A few things, but it’s a series with promise.

Many more new voices and one-offs in non-fiction. Tom Reiss, Fritz Stern (ok not completely new), David Hackett Fischer (though I do wish he’d written the promised additional volumes). The Race Beat is terrific on the civil rights struggle in the US and the crucial role of the media, which was understood clearly by both sides. Ivan’s War deserves a full-scale review, though the private Soviet soldier’s perspective is summed up in three brutal sentences: “They called us. They trained us. They killed us.” The River of Doubt captures not only Teddy Roosevelt but much about early 20th century America, exploration and Brazil.

Complete list (in order read) is below the fold. Links are to previous writing about the book or author on AFOE.
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Tales of the Interregnum

First, Radoslaw Sikorski told Gazeta Wyborcza. Then Donald Tusk told the German newspaper whose web site is better than it used to be.

Sikorski — who is Poland’s foreign minister, used to be its defense minister and is married to Washington Post columnist Anne Applebaum — said that proceeding with the proposed American missile defense sites in his country would definitely have political costs, and it was not clear whether something might change on the American side. His country was not prepared to incur definite costs for something that might not come to pass anyway.

Translation: Bush is out of power in 368 days (not that anyone’s counting), and his administration can go and whistle.

Tusk told the Frankfurter Allgemeine essentially the same thing. He was more tactful, of course, saying decisions about the program didn’t have to “be a race.” His Czech counterpart, Mirek Topolanek, was equally circumspect. He said that quality was more important than speed.

Translation: Prime Ministers let their cabinet colleagues speak more directly, but really, Bush is out of power in 368 days (not that anyone’s counting), and his administration can go and whistle.

So it’s an interesting period in transatlantic relations. Bush-administration initiatives are getting shelved, the succession is unclear, and what the successor’s policy will be like is even more unclear. Politics and vacuums being what they are, some unusual things could bubble up at the working level, or unexpected players could be taking initiatives. But as the Czech and Polish leaders are pointing out, pet projects of the outgoing US administration that are widely opposed in their countries will not find much favor.

I had hoped that Daniel Davies would work up another nifty model for when people would stop paying attention to Bush, but it looks like we have empirical data.

Russian Elections, Ukrainian Government

Cards shuffled in the EU’s most important eastern neighbors. The orange parties in Ukraine have reached a coalition agreement that will put Yulia Timoshenko back in the prime minister’s office. Let’s hope she lasts longer this time.

Meanwhile to the north, the party supported by Russian president Putin is expected to win a crushing victory in parliamentary elections on Sunday. Observers from the OSCE will not be attending — for the first time since there have been post-Soviet elections in Russia. Gary Kasparov, former chess champion and sometime candidate for president of Russia, will be attending — fresh from five days in jail on rather dubious charges related to opposition to Putin’s party. Boris Nemtsov, one-time mayor of Nizhny Novgorod and leading reformer in the early post-Soviet period, will presumably also be attending — despite publicly comaring Putin to Lukashenka at a press event marking Kasparov’s release.

Soon we will know the players in the inevtiable next round of wrangles over energy supplies, prices and politics in Central and Eastern Europe.

Brown shadows

One of the things that’s generally known about Germany, but not often spoken about for various reasons(1), is how much continuity there was between the Third Reich and the early days of the Federal Republic. A certain degree of continuity is inevtiable any time a government changes; even the Bolsheviks brought back a lot of Tsarist officials simply because no one else knew how things worked. But the questions for West Germany after the war are how many, for how long and at what level?

Over time, and thanks in no small measure to confrontations in the late 1960s, more and more German institutions have taken an honest look at who did what to whom during the Nazi period, and where they ended up afterward. The answers to the three questions have often been quite a few, for their whole careers, and at leadership levels. Several forces have gotten companies and institutions to be more truthful about their activities from 1933 to 1945, and the continuity between that period and the postwar era. One such has been the simple passage of time. People who would have been expected to pay a price are now retired, or dead. No doubt, knowledge is coming at the cost of justice.

The latest institution to undertake such an examination is Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, or BKA). Credit to the BKA’s current president, Jörg Ziercke. He didn’t have to do it, and he didn’t have to let it be done so thoroughly. What has turned up in a study by historians is a remarkable number of SS men who went on to leadership positions in the BKA. Files used by the Gestapo to harass and persecute Roma and Sinti were taken over by the BKA, and harassment continued well into the postwar era, in some form at least into the 1980s. The views on “criminal biology” formed during the Third Reich were still influental at the BKA into the 1970s. The essential stories are here, here and here, from the newspaper whose web site still could be better organized. (I had hoped to translate these for this post, but real life kept getting in the way. The story hasn’t really made it into English-language media yet.) There was also a Sunday article, complete with charts of who from the SS rose to what position in the BKA, but I can’t find it online. The English-language Spiegel online has a summary here.

The questions resonate in the present, as post-Communist countries continue to wrestle with the legacies of their dictatorships. Who rose to power? Who did they step on to get there? What are the demands of justice in a new era? Other European countries have their own debates, and indeed their comforting myths, about collaboration, about wartime acts, about the fates of fellow citizens.

There aren’t any easy answers, especially more than half a century later. One good side effect is that the revelations may prompt Germany’s main intelligence service, the BND, and the constitutional protection office (Verfassungsschutz) to examine their pasts. With luck, they will be as honest as the BKA.

(1) Soviet occupation of Central and Eastern Europe was a key reason at the time. As years passed, additional reasons came to include embarassment, fear of personal consequences, unwillingness to bother the old folks and now the passing of people with firsthand knowledge and consequent general ignorance. Another is that Germany has turned into a reasonably well functioning democracy despite the Nazi pasts of many people in its institutions.