Viva Ricardo!

Guy of these pages recently spoke to a “source” who has an interesting counter-take on the Italian economy and the Italian government’s debt problem to that frequently discussed here. Apparently, the feller says, there’s no chance of “an Argentinian-style blowout” because of the low levels of private debt.

The source is essentially arguing that Ricardian equivalence holds for Italy. That is to say, private and public savings ratios match each other-when the government borrows, the private sector saves, and vice versa. Hence the recovery path after a debt crisis would be that firms and households load up on debt to invest and consume, kick starting a Keynesian recovery.

Now, it’s an observable fact that the Italian government is up to its neck in debt and households are hoarding cash, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that Ricardian equivalence holds. Correlation does not imply causation, and Ricardian equivalence itself is anything but uncontroversial. In fact, it’s not so much an economic theory as a point for discussion, despite having been around almost as long as economics itself. There are some cases that support it – Israel in the 1980s being the classic – but a lot that don’t.

Arguments that fit the facts are always preferable to ones that don’t, but yer man is a braver man than me if he is basing his business decisions on this theory. Especially, I’m not at all clear on what the intermediate analysis/microfoundations are meant to be-how do we get from here to there? Presumably the Eurocrisis option would be one – out of the €, deep devaluation, export-led recovery and follow through to the domestic economy. But the pain of such a course would be epic. And it’s still worth pointing out that I still haven’t met a European business person who considers it even within the realm of the non-crazed (perhaps I don’t deal with enough Italians). More seriously, the panic and Weltuntergangsstimmung that would accompany such a course would have dramatically depressing effects on those ol’ animal spirits.

What of a forced Ricardian equivalence, about the only other story I can see that would satisfy our man’s argument? Imagine that the Italian government retires large quantities (perhaps massive quantities in the course of a debt crisis) of bonds from private and institutional investors and refinances them with the banks. Government paper is a reserve asset, and an increase in reserve assets should mean a multiple increase in credit creation to the private sector. One may recall that some monetarist-minded governments have been keen on manipulating the balance between T-bill-like assets held by banks and bonds held by funds and individuals in order to influence the creation of credit, usually in a deflationary direction – so why not in an inflationary direction?

It’s a bit like reversing the economic flux capacitor, and it’s certainly what in computing we would call a horrible, kludgy hack, and the inflationary bit could easily go well out of kilter, and the whole thing would be dependent on a lot of good will from a lot of banks, but it bears a passing resemblance to some proposals of Paul Krugman’s regarding Japan in the late 1990s. Edward Hugh will no doubt call attention to the similarities between the problems.

Does the weirdness of the solutions mark the optimism of the “source’s” argument? Or is it a long shot..but it might just work? A key number will clearly be the percentage of Italian government debt held by banks.

Three Points to Remember

February in Paris, 1983. A group of student leaders are ushered into the presence of President Mitterand by huissiers. They stay slightly more than an hour, discussing Marxism-Leninism, youth, and society with the ever-inconsistent, sometimes brilliant, sometimes crooked, sometimes socialist and sometime fascist president. Years later, one of them, Jean-Claude Cambalebis remembers the three questions Mitterand advised him to deal with if he wanted to “avoid becoming Minister of Public Works”.

They were as follows: the first, he said, was Poland, or more specifically that spiritual power had defeated political power there. The second was the way Britain would never be European and would always prefer to maintain ties with its favoured trading partners in the Commonwealth. For the third, Mitterand produced an electronic listening device (un puce electronique) from his pocket and remarked that such things would “turn the organisation of work upside-down”.

23 years down-range from that meeting with the UNEF executive committee at the Elysée Palace, and ten years on from Mitterand’s death, how do those part-predictions, part-suggestions stack up?

More in the geek hole..
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Promises, Promises, But More Than A Technical Detail

Well the eurozone government deficit problem has hit the agenda with a thud again in the last few days. Yesterday the FT ran a story about how the ECB has decided that it will not accept government paper (bonds) in the future from any country which has not maintained at least an A- rating from one or more of the principal debt assesment agencies. (Dave Altig at MacroBlog has also covered the story here, and Nouriel Roubini here). Today the FT has another story about how Trichet has confirmed the policy, and how the Commission too plans to get tough (well they would, wouldn’t they, since this may now become a credibility auction).

This topic must appear appaulingly technical and yawn-provoking to the non-economist. In fact nothing could be further from the truth. Let me explain a bit.
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ECB Interest Rate Policy

Brad Setser has a post today on Kate Moss, not provoked by her evidently economically intriguing modelling properties, but due to the Kate-Moss-thin credit-spreads which Bloomberg’s William Pesek refers to in this article. What really turns Pesek on it turns out isn’t Kate Moss at all but the possible existence of links between China’s economic boom and the recent surge in popularity for credit derivatives.

And it is in the context of this evolutionary chain that Brad Setser’s work on China and Systematic Risk offers itself as some kind of missing link.
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Unpredicatble Predictability

Just a brief post to let you know that Mark Thoma and I are doing some guest posting this weekover at New Economist.

Perhaps the most interesting dimension is the amicable debate which Mark and I are having about the respective merits of the more activist Fed monetary policy and the rather more quietist approach of the ECB. Highly recommended are Mark’s posts here and here. Perhaps surprisingly, I tend to be more impressed with Greenspan and the Fed, while Mark finds a much more coherent policy from the ECB than I would be inclined to grant: is this an example of the grass on the other side of the fence always looking greener?

China Comes Off The Renminbi Dollar Peg

This is a big news day. China has just announced that it is going to come off the dollar peg currency arrangement. Well it’s not that simple, they have announced a 2% appreciation of the currency against the dollar, and that the renminbi will now float against a basket of currencies. In fact this is a very ‘dirty’ float, since the trading price of the US dollar against the renminbi will now float within a trading band of plus or minus 0.3 per cent, while the band of other currencies against the renminbi will be set by the central bank, at least this is what the official statement says. How this will work will doubtless become clear in the coming days. Still a start is a start, and in many ways this is a historic day.

Update: Around the blogs: Brad Setser is well onto this. As is Daniel Dresner who points us to this Wall Street Journal report by Michael Phillips.

Combustible Politics

I have felt for some time that Rober Maroni would not have been so outspoken without at least the tacit permission of Silvio Berlusconi, and now we have the evidence to back my hunch:

“Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi called the euro a “disaster,” blaming the currency for Italy’s economic slump and seeking to use anti-euro sentiment in his election campaign against opposition leader Romano Prodi.

“Prodi’s euro has been a ripoff,”

With Italy in its second recession in as many years, the euro is proving to be a “disaster,” Berlusconi, 68, said. Berlusconi has blamed the euro for raising prices and choking exports.

Something Worries Me About Peter Bofinger

Really I realise I have been remiss in another important sense. I have long assumed that in fact the decision to reduce deficits was taken due to the coming fiscal pressure from ageing. This certainly was the background to the discussion. However now I look at the details of the SPG this area is not mentioned (as far as I can see) and the other – the free rider and associated – is the principal consideration.

So those who criticize the bureaucratic and infexible nature of the ECB are in the right to this extent. Of course the underlying demographics *should* be part of the pact, but that is another story.

I find myself in a tricky situation, since I am deeply sceptical that the euro can work, and now after the French vote even more so, but since it has been set in motion, the best thing is obviously to try and make it work (even while doubting). So I am thinking about all this. Obviously I should try and write a longer post making this clearer.

The SGP was adopted at the Amsterdam Council 1997. A history of the implementation of the pact, and a summary of the debate over the new pact can be found here. The Stability and Growth Pact was designed as a framework to prevent inflationary processes at the national level. For this purpose it obliges national governments to follow the simple rule of a balanced budget or a slight surplus.

Now if we go back to the origins of the pact, to the communication of the European Commission on 3 September 2004, you will find the following:

“As regards the debt criterion, the revised Stability and Growth Pact could clarify the basis for assessing the “satisfactory pace” of debt reduction provided for in Article 104(2)(b) of the Treaty. In defining this “satisfactory pace”, account should be taken of the need to bring debt levels back down to prudent levels before demographic ageing has an impact on economic and social developments in Member States. Member States’ initial debt levels and their potential growth levels should also be considered. Annual assessments could be made relative to this reference pace of reduction, taking into account country-specific growth conditions.”

Now curiously I have found nothing in Bofingers argument which seems even to vaguely recognise this background.

A good starting point for this topic would be the conference “Economic and Budgetary Implications of Global Ageing held by the Commission in March 2003.

The European Council in Stockholm of March 2001
agreed that ?the Council should regularly review the
long-term sustainability of public finances, including the
expected strains caused by the demographic changes
ahead. This should be done both under the guidelines
(BEPGs) and in the context of the stability and
convergence programmes.?

This document on the history of EU thinking on ageing and sustainability is incredible.
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Christian Noyer: Much Ado About Nothing?

The euro fell briefly below $1.19 yesterday. There is nothing surprising or exceptional about that, the common currency has been drifting steadily downwards against the dollar for a number of, by-now, pretty well known reasons – better economic performance in the US, a growing interest rate differential between the ECB and the Fed, political issues following the referendum noes, and an incapacity to decide what to do with the SGP. Yesterday however, an apparently new element was introduced: Christian Noyer, and his appearance before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly.

That this should have caused a stir surprises me. Christian Noyer is Governor of the French national bank (and not simply, as much of the press report, an ECB governing council member). It is therefore perfectly logical that when asked whether any country could leave the eurozone, he should reply in the affirmative. EU member states are, as Noyer says, still sovereign nations. He would therefore have been lying to answer ‘no, it is impossible’. Curiously, the other part of M. Noyer’s recorded testimony, that any exit would put in question continued membership of the EU is far more debateable, yet seems to have attracted far less attention.

Membership of a currency union is (or should be) an economic, not a political decision. Decisions on entry or exit should therefore be taken on economic grounds, and discussions of the issues involved should be possible without an atmosphere of emotional hysteria. Of course, if your currency falls simply because someone states the obvious (I mean the information content *is* zero), then this may indicate that there is a rather deeper problem knocking around somewhere or other.

Update: Jean-Claude Trichet yesterday defended the current ECB TWIRP stance (two per cent interest rate policy) before the European parliament?s monetary affairs committee and understandably rejected a call for an annual evaluation of the benefits of the common currency for zone-member citizens.
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Coup de Grace for Italy, or for the SGP?

Well I got it wrong (or so it seems). Someone has ‘leaked’ to the FT the news that Italy will be ‘given two years grace’ on the deficit problem. If this is confirmed I suppose it shows that the Commission fears more the Italian voters than it does the international financial markets. Obviously a ‘to the letter of the law’ application of the revised SGP would present Italy with hard economic decisions (which she will face anyway), but not applying it tests yet one more time the credibility of the EU’s institutions. It depends I suppose which you think is more damaging in the long run.
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