The Euro-Zone March PMI Holds Near February’s Record-Low

The Euro-Zone composite Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) rose slightly in March (to 37.6) from the record low of 36.2 registered in February. The PMI reading for manufacturing rose to 34.0 (from 33.6) while the services component was up to 40.1 (from 38.9). (You need to bear in mind that 50 is the neutral point (marking the boundary between expansion and contraction) on these indexes, and any reading below 40 means a very significant rate of contraction).

Bottom, I See No Bottom, Only A Mirky Deep Below

So it now seems virtually certain that the Q1 Eurozone GDP contraction will be far worse than the Q4 2008 one. Taking into account that the eurozone contracted by 0.2% in Q3 2008, and by 1.5% in Q4, then, in my humble opinion, the data we are seeing for this quarter are entirely consistent with a 2% quarterly contraction (or an annualised 8% rate of contraction) or more. As I said last month, not quite Japan territory yet, but certainly not far behind. And for those who simply don’t believe the PMIs can tell you so much, here is Markit’s own chart, showing the strong underlying relationship between movements in GDP and the *flash* composite PMI. Pretty impressive I would say.

Economic activity in Germany seems to have continued to contract at virtually the same rate in March as in February, as the services PMI was 41.7 (up from 41.3, the sixth straight month of contraction) while manufacturing PMI increased to 32.4 from 32.1. And we are at the height of the stimulus package here. Downside risk for the German economy for the second half of this year now looks very strong indeed. That Commerzbank 7% annual contraction forecast is looking more and more credible. Continue reading

Serbia Receives 3 Billion Euro IMF Loan

Well, the news is just rolling in off the wires this morning:

The International Monetary Fund and Serbia have agreed a 27-month, 3 billion euro programme to help the Balkan nation enforce the biggest spending cuts in years needed to anchor its weakening economy.

“Serbia’s GDP will almost certainly decline in 2009 … It looks more likely to be minus two percent. And we believe that growth in 2010 will be flat,” Albert Jaeger, IMF chief of mission, told a news conference.

He said the loan would probably be approved in early May and fiscal adjustment was the key tackling Serbia’s external and domestic financing gaps. The IMF said a fiscal gap of 3.0 percent of GDP was the maximum Serbia could finance, while a sharp fiscal adjustment, including a wage and pension freeze in 2009 and 2010, will help Serbia attain a more balanced external position.

What more can I say? The Eastern crisis is extending rapidly, more rapidly than we are deploying means to contain it. I don’t have time to go into this much more at this point, but I thought it might be worth reproducing a dialogue that went on over a mail thread this morning, between two people with a strong interest in what is happening in Serbia. Continue reading

The Latvian Cat Is Out Of The Bag

Reuters this morning:

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) would back a devaluation in Latvia, but the government, central bank and European Commission are against, the prime minister was quoted on Thursday as saying. It was the first clear statement by a policy maker about a differing stance between the IMF and Latvia and its other lenders over the currency, though the Fund has warned that keeping the currency peg during a sharp downturn would be tough. “The International Monetary Fund has no objection to a devaluation of the lat, but the European Commission, Bank of Latvia (central bank) and the government do not support this solution,” Baltic news agency BNS quoted Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis as telling a meeting of regional journalists.

and Nordea flash comment:

According to Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis the IMF has no objection to a devaluation of LVL. However, he continues that the European commission, Bank of Latvia and the government are against devaluation. IMF’s opinion counts as Latvia is asking the fund for a permission to increase the budget deficit to 7% of the GDP from the agreed 5%. Latvian economic contraction has been worse than expected. Getting out of the woods requires that competitiveness must be improved. This can be done by external or internal devaluation. IMF’s stance highlights the risk of external devaluation. However, it is not a done deal since the political opposition is very hard. Some 90% of the Latvian loans are in foreign currency and hence external devaluation would affect most Latvian households and companies. Ongoing discussion emphasizes the importance of hedging the Baltic FX risk. If Latvia gives up, speculation that the other Baltic countries follow, increases.

This was always like this, and even though Ambrose Evans Pritchard glossed it all up a bit by talking about secret IMF documents that had been leaked, the information was always freely available in this report of the IMF website:

A change in the peg is strongly opposed by the Latvian authorities and by the EU institutions, and thus would undermine program ownership. The quasicurrency board has been an anchor of macroeconomic stability for more than 15 years, was able to withstand the 1998 Russian crisis, and commands popular and political support. Any change in regime would cause significant economic, social and political disruption.

The authorities and staff examined the merits of alternative exchange rate regimes. A widening of the exchange rate band to ±15 percent (as permitted under ERM2; currently Latvia has unilaterally adopted a ±1 percent band) would result in a larger initial output decline, since adverse balance sheet effects would reduce domestic demand. However, competitiveness would improve more quickly, reducing the current account deficit and fostering a more rapid economic recovery. The case for changing the parity would be stronger if it could be accompanied by immediate euro adoption. Technically, this would address many of the risks described above, and give Latvia deeper access to capital markets. With its negligible public sector debt, the government would also find it easier to borrow in euros on international capital markets. However, the EU authorities have firmly ruled out this option, given its inconsistency with the Maastricht Treaty and the precedents it would set for other potential euro area entrants.

So the only real news that Valdis Dombrovskis seems to be announcing today is that the central bank the Latvian government, the EU Commission, the ECB (and possibly) the Nordic Banks are the explicit villains of the piece.

Personally I am very sorry that we are now coming to what may turn out to be a “disordely” resolution of the four East European pegs, since I think it didn’t have to be like this, as I have argued in:

Why The IMF’s Decision To Agree A Lavian Bailout Programme Without Devaluation Is A Mistake

Why Latvia Needs To Devalue Soon – A Reply To Christoph Rosenberg

Why You Need Devaluation – An Open Letter To The People Of Estonia

Devaluation, Euro Membership And Loan Defaults – Some Thoughts For My Critics

Basically, if we go back to my last post on toxicity, and look at the causal chain:

Financial Crisis -> Real Economy Crisis -> Political Crisis

we can see that it is the political crisis which ultimately breaks the loop. Without the devaluation Latvia is stuck in a self reinforcing contraction where budget cuts slow the economy further and make necessary further cuts, while all the time more and more toxic assets are created, faster than you can borrow the money to clean them up (you know, the ball of negative energy that feeds on itself).

Update Dombrovskis “Corrects” Himself

According to the latest out of Reuters Riga, Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis clarified later this morning (Thursday) that the International Monetary Fund was not currently seeking a devaluation of the lat currency. Speaking to reporters at the talks he is holding with IMF representatives, Dombrovskis said his earlier words were a “historical review” of negotiations last year with the IMF. “The current agreement of an unchanged exchange rate remains in force,” he told reporters. Of course, no one doubted it. But still……..

Interestingly, the Reuters reports on the story are both written by the same journalist, yet while the first comes direct from the Riga office, the second is routed via the Stockholm one. There wouldn’t be a slight difference in perspective here depending on your vantage point, would there?

“Toxicity” Is A State of Mind

You know, one of the things which amazes me about the present discourse surrounding the crisis is the way people seem to trot out all the old formulae, without giving a moments though to what they actually mean. “In the long run we are all dead” is an obvious case in point. Who really stops for long enough nowadays to think about what Keynes was actually getting at? “Animal Spirits” would be another. Continue reading

Ten years since the bombs started falling

On Serbia. Or, as it was then, Yugoslavia.

The Kosovo War has been debated, God knows, enough times. Still, a couple of things. One is this interesting article from the always-worth-reading Nenad Pejic. (Favorite line: “the official speeches spend all their time remembering that Serbia was bombed but never mention why Serbia was bombed.”) This bit was particularly interesting IMO:

Mladic remains at large and Serbia remains in denial about the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica. Schoolchildren are taught about crimes committed against Serbs, but not about crimes committed by Serbs. This policy of denial has created an alarming situation among young Serbs. A 2007 poll of youths found that more than 30 percent say “there is no need” to be acquainted with ethnic Albanians. Fifty percent think the Cyrillic alphabet should be given preference to the Latin alphabet. Twenty-five percent “cannot imagine” having sex with a member of another ethnic group, and 20 percent expressed a desire to live in an ethnically pure state. It is unlikely these figures have improved since the poll was taken.

To be fair, I should say it is likely the responses would be similar among ethnic-Albanian youths in Kosovo. I shudder to think what these attitudes mean for the region when this generation takes over political power.

Continue reading

Culminating point

After spending a bit of time recently in the various battlefields and cemeteries of Flanders, this topic has been much on my mind. It’s one of those simple but non-obvious military ideas that explains a lot more than you’d expect. Basically, the culminating point is the furthest that the attacker can go while still remaining superior to the defender. From the attacker’s point of view, you need to plan to reach your objective before you hit the culminating point, while the defender wants to do one of two things: bring the culminating point forward or move the objective backward, in order to be able to counterattack against an inferior attacker.

Which is all very dry and rather tricky to follow. Continue reading

Paging Vaclav Klaus

The response to yesterday’s no-confidence vote in the Czech government, holder of the EU Council Presidency, was a standard “move along folks, nothing to see here”.  Normal service would not be interrupted, the remaining 3 months of the Presidency would continue, and the grip-and-grin festival with Barack Obama next week would continue as before.

That was presumably before the lame duck PM Mirek Topolánek’s bizarre speech to the European Parliament today, which is going to go down like a lead balloon in Washington (and probably London too) —

Continue reading

Warm Up Acts

On April 9, 1989, Soviet troops put down a demonstration in Tbilisi calling for the restoration of Georgian independence. As Thomas Goltz puts it in Georgia Diary:

This time, however, the local garrison of Soviet army conscripts usually called upon to maintain order was replaced by paratroopers, and when they moved against the sea of unarmed protestors, their weapons of choice and coercion were shovels. Nineteen protestors were bludgeoned to death, and many more seriously injured.

For the 20th anniversary, the opposition is making a substantial push to oust president Sakaashvili, whose term would otherwise run through 2013.

In general, transition countries are better served if governments and high officials are only turned out of office by legal and constitutional means. It took the Slovaks some time to get rid of Meciar, and the Romanians to get rid of Iliescu, but their institutions are stronger for having done so within the regular framework of the state.

On the other hand, the war with Russia last year was a colossal blunder on the part of Saakashvili’s government, the kind that would bring down a leader in a purely parliamentary system. Further, more post-communist states started out with reasonably strong presidencies than ended up with them. Poland, for example, initially gave the president strong powers and in particular the right of co-determination of crucial ministries such as defense and foreign affairs. (This led to several crises during Lech Walesa’s time in office.) In general, the trend across Central and Eastern Europe has been for increasingly assertive parliaments to erode the powers of the presidents. That tendency would also argue for parliament to work on sidelining Saakashvili.

The president and his allies, who still command a majority in parliament, are not about to stand down. And the opposition is working to heat things up. I’m skeptical that Georgia will see a change of government in the next month, but the political temperature is definitely rising.

Good local coverage in English is at Civil.ge. [Update: Their site does not seem to play nicely with Firefox.]
Continue reading

Czech Government Falls

The coalition led by Mirek Topolanek was forced out of power last night after losing a confidence vote in parliament, 101-96, over its handling of the economy.

Off the top of my head, I can’t think of another time in the last 10 years that a government has fallen while it held the EU presidency. Given the present rotation, the Czechs won’t get another chance until the 2020s. Oops.

Topolanek will stay on as a caretaker until Czech President Vaclav Klaus names a new prime minister who can assemble a working coalition in parliament. If three attempts to form a government fail, early elections must be called. What a mess!

Japan’s Exports Fall An Annual 49% In February

Japan’s exports fell by a record 49.4 percent in February as deepening recessions in the U.S. and Europe, and a sharp slowdown in China hit demand for Japanese products around the globe. Shipments to the U.S., still Japan’s biggest market, dropped an unprecedented 58.4 percent from a year earlier. Car exports were down 70.9 percent. This follows January’s year on year drop of 45.7%.

February’s drop in exports was the greatest since at least 1980, when the government started to keep comparable data.

Japan’s ageing population and workforce has lead it to become increasingly reliant on exports for GDP growth, as consumer demand stagnates internally. Japan is thus especially sensitive to changes in world trade patterns, and with the World Trade Organization forecasting trade will shrink 9 percent this year (the most since World War II) Japan looks especially vulnerable. During Japan’s expansion of 2002 to 2007, exports rose as a portion of GDP to 15.6 percent from 10.4 percent.

And it isn’t only Japan which will be affected by this, since imports were down by 43%, and of course China is quite dependent on exports it sends to Japan. Continue reading