About Jamie Kenny

Jamie is a journalist from the UK.

techniques of the counter-revolution

It looks like the Empire is striking back on multiple fronts. So far as I can see, these seem to have been the lessons learned by regional authoritarians from Egypt.

Never mind the martyrs. Given that ‘martyrdom’ had a catalytic effect on protest in Egypt and Tunisia, you’d have thought that other regimes would have taken care to handle demonstrators more gently. Not so, as events today in Bahrain have demonstrated and as shown in Yemen over the weekend. The issue instead appears to be control of the streets. Once the demonstrators in Egypt and Tunisia had it, they couldn’t be dislodged. So go in fast, early and hard.

Deny the revolution its focal point. That appears to have been the purpose of the raid on the Pearl roundabout in Manama. There have been reports of sporadic clashes in the city since then, but it’s hard either for reporters to get a handle on where or for demonstrators to find a place to assemble.

Get the countergangs in early. The protests in Egypt rapidly reached such a critical mass that the baltagiya lost their ability to intimidate. Indeed, they were defeated by physical force from the demonstrators. So they need to be used before that point is reached, as they are in Iran, Yemen and Libya.

Hijack the agenda. Issandr El Amrani on the forthcoming protests in Morocco:

…a confusion has been deliberately created that the February 20 protests are about overthrowing King Muhammad VI, which they are absolutely not about: they are largely about socio-economic grievances and the need for the reforms that the regime has pretended to undertake to actually be implemented, starting with constitutional reform to make Morocco into a genuine constitutional monarchy rather than an absolute one that disguises what it is by calling itself an "executive monarchy".

For the past two weeks, the regime propaganda machine has created an outpouring of affection from Muhammad VI. Much of it is based on genuine respect for the institution of the monarchy as well as the man himself, but it is dangerous to play with the king's image in this way. One possible backlash is that on February 20 the protestors will get attacked as traitors. Street violence can get pretty savage in Morocco — I dread to think what might happen

Handle this right and you get yourself a genuine loyalist mob.

Be a social dictatorship. Evgeny Morozev got a lot of stick over the past week or so for his scepticism about the role of social media in democratization. His proposition is that new and social media can be a force multiplier for dictatorships which take the trouble to understand its potential and use it effectively. This is the proposition under test now across the region. So far we’ve had Libyan terror messaging, facebook phishing exercises by Sudanese security forces and Iranian wumaodang twitter accounts. No doubt we'll get more along similar lines.

Use it or lose it. It’s difficult to say how effective all of this is. Protests don’t seem to be reaching critical numbers. On the other hand, demonstrators are persisting in the face of constant and occasionally lethal state violence (every day for the past week in Yemen).

One thing that’s going to be prominent in regime calculations is the response of Western and particularly American policy to the Egyptian uprising, which made it clear that a) western powers want their local policies to remain as they are, but aren’t betting everything on maintaining any given government and b) if protests get too big, then there’s nothing your western friends can do for you. So the way to respond is to use every repressive resource in your arsenal to stop them getting too big. Current signals coming from Washington – welcoming the Iranian protests, ignoring the ones elsewhere – seem to indicate that this strategy is generally acceptable.

Libya’s the country to watch here. Ghaddafi’s new friends would drop him like a hot brick if if only for someone less embarrassing given half an excuse, and he’s still on bad terms with the Saudis and the GCC states, so no prospect of exile there. He’s the one actually at risk of ending his rule swinging from a palm tree, and that possibility is going to dictate his response to the local uprising. Given our role in the Megrahi affair, it’ll be interesting to see what Britain’s response to that will be.

then and now and here and there

Question: if Iraq hadn't been invaded back then, would we be seeing the same kind of thing in Baghdad as we saw in Cairo yesterday? I don't think you can definitively say yes. If revolutions were predictable, they wouldn't happen at all. But it seems equally impossible to say that it couldn't have happened in the light of events over the last two months. Of course, between 2003 and whenever it did happen the Iraqis would have had to put up with Saddam. But given what they've had to put up with since then that would not necessarily have been the worst option.

the smart money got out years ago

In 2006, 2007 and 2008, Egypt’s GDP jumped into the hundred billion range annually. As this growth occurred, illicit flows peaked at US$13.0 bil, US$13.6 bil, and US$ 7.4 bil; respectively. Those engaging in corrupt and criminal activity were certainly getting their cut of the country’s growth.

The dip down to US$7.4 in 2008 was due in part to a sharp outflow of licit capital late in the year, when according to the IMF foreign investors pulled out of equity and government debt markets reflecting diminished confidence in Egypt and a lowered appetite for risk. “The rapid capital outflow in late 2008 was met mostly with a drawdown in official reserves and the Central Bank of Egypt’s (CBE’s) foreign currency deposits with commercial banks.” As the economy and financial markets contracted, so did the volume of money corrupt officials and criminals could break off for themselves.

 

where axis of evil meets Arab moderation

A little more about that missile relationship I mentioned earlier. The one between Egypt and North Korea:

At the same time, Egypt has counted on North Korea for military aid in the 1970s and began purchasing Scud missiles from North Korea around the time that Mubarak became president. North Korea also provided the technology for Egypt to manufacture missiles on it own.

“Cairo is the hub of North Korea’s missile export,” says Choi Jin-wook, who follows North Korean affairs as senior fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification. Mr. Choi says North Korea’s embassy in Cairo is headquarters for the North’s Middle East military sales network and ranks as the North’s “most important embassy” after its embassy in Beijing.

Choi believes the deal with Orascom calls for North Korea to pay for the telecom network in hard currency earned from the sale of missiles and technology to clients including Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Libya.

Orascom is the Egyptian telecoms firm behind the North’s Koryolink mobile network. It’s kind of interesting that Pyongyang would work on something so sensitive with a country which has extensive intelligence co-operation with the US. It apparently has Vice President Suleiman’s nephew on retainer.

But what’s even more interesting about all this is that it was allowed to go on in the face of what was supposed to be a rigorous sanctions regime against Pyongyang and its weapons sales, also the source of collateral charges of evil against Iran, Syria, Myanmar etc.

ancient warfare

Incredible stuff:

The pro-Mubarak crowd suddenly retreated, and the pro-democracy protesters advanced a moveable wall of metal shields to a new front line much further up.

A side battle erupted down a street behind the pro-Mubarak lines, with rock throwing and molotov cocktails.

which means that the anti-regime protestors have organised flank protection. Army input here?

An armored personnel carrier opened fire into the air, shooting red tracers up over Cairo, in an apparent effort to disperse/frighten the pro-Mubarak crowd, who contracted again.

The pro-democracy protesters are now advancing their line of staggered metal shields farther and farther and seem to have gained decisive momentum.

This war nerd piece is absolutely recommended (cheers to Chris).

The journalists on scene are obviously trying to make it clear who, in the general picture, is doing the attacking and who are the victims. But what's equally clear is that there's terrific resistance from the demonstrators; that's why they're still occupying the square. And they appear to be making a fantastic job of it.

i see dominos

The Jacksonauts make their contribution to public discourse:

MPs were given a stark warning this week: "We've already lost Turkey, Lebanon is gone too" – and now the west can't afford to lose Egypt.

The bearer of this message was Mort Zuckerman, the American newspaper and property mogul. He was in Westminster as a guest of the neoconservative Henry Jackson Society, which boasts Michael Gove and Nick Boles among its supporters.

Well, yeah: thanks for that. Allegra Stratton says that the Tories are divided over Egypt and suspicious of their soft-on-the-muslims coalition chums. Well, probably. It’s not a three line whip issue. Personally I think Cameron has been a distinct improvement on this predecessor but one on this. I heard him yesterday going on about how despicable the violence was and thought he sounded…well, quite sweet, really.

The worst prospect for people like the Henry Jackson Society is if the Egyptian revolution succeeds and doesn’t lead to the Brothers establishing the Nilotic branch caliphate. It’s not a result you’d welcome if your financing and raison d’etre is threat-mongering. A lot of so called anti-jihadists have already flipped over into alternate reality, but that’s not an option if you have pretensions to respectability. Not so much, anyway.

goons of yore

Mubarak’s goon squads remind me a bit of the countergangs organised by the Indonesian army to try and terrify the population of East Timor into voting against independence in 1999. They’re described at length in Richard Lloyd Parry’s In the time of Madness.

A number of recruits for these outfits – with names like Red and White Iron – were drawn from children orphaned by the TNI in the original round of massacres after the 1975 invasion and raised in Indonesian orphanages. There was a payroll vote, as you’d expect, and criminal elements raised through various rackets run by Kopassus* partly as a means of harvesting street muscle as required. Quite a few were recruited through an organisation called Gardapaski, supposedly a local version of the Grameen Bank. What it actually did was front money to unemployed young men in return for their support when necessary.

Obviously, Mubarrak’s people will have their own channels for getting the meat on the street. I guess the point here is that a reasonably imaginative dictatorship has all sorts of ways to get the people it needs to do the things it wants done while not wearing official uniforms and that we won’t find out what they are until the system that does it is brought to an end.

And it’ll have to end now. A couple of days ago it was pretty clear that if they put Husni on a plane then the policy status quo could stay basically unchanged; that the removal of Mubarrak would carry enough of a symbolic charge to preserve most of the power of the local overclass, though of course things would have to become more inclusive. I thought that was the strategy: make Husni, or his absence, the change we can believe in, and yay reform. But not now. How can you hope to have an even partially fair election in nine months with the power structure that caused today’s carnage still basically in control?

also: buy gold

"I believe that I can make a case in the end that there are three powers that you will see really emerge. One, a Muslim caliphate that controls the Mideast and parts of Europe. Two, China, that will control Asia, the southern half of Africa, part of the Middle East, Australia, maybe New Zealand, and God only knows what else. And Russia, which will control all of the old former Soviet Union bloc, plus maybe the Netherlands.

A lot of this isn’t too far away from what a lot of rightwingers seem to believe, but what’s the business about Russia and Holland?

it’s all about…

The Guardian has a screenshot of Cleggy boy’s negotiating positions re the Tories: 

But it is the detail at the end of the note which is most revealing. Under the heading "Roles" Clegg lists the two main issues as "ratios" and "me".

and also:

Funding for opposition parties: so called "short money."

Trebles all round, then.